Military Historical Library

Chapter 4. Entry into the War of the Chinese Volunteers. Retreat of UN Forces and the South Korean Army from the DPRK. Combat Operations in the Areas Adjacent to the 38^th Parallel

In October 1950 the DPRK and its armed forces found themselves in an exclusively difficult situation. The weakened forces of the National Army, with up to four divisions in the 1^st KPA Group Army on the Sinuiju direction and the remnants of the units of the 2^nd KPA Group Army on the east coast, suffering under the strikes by I US and X US Corps and I ROK and II ROK Corps, were forced to fight under extremely hard conditions while withdrawing into the depths of the country. On 23 October UN forces captured Pyongyang and Hamhung. In reaching the 40^th Parallel, they had actually gone as far as the border with the PRC in several places, threatening its industrial supply base – northeastern China .

Together with the situation created and with the goal of turning back the offensive by South Korean and American forces, as well as to show aid to their brothers, the Korean people, on 19 October 30 infantry divisions and four artillery divisions of the Chinese Peoples’ Volunteers began to move out of China and into the territory of the DPRK; these were divided up into two group armies. With the goal of coordinating combat operations of the CPV and the Peoples Army, a Unified Command was created in which both representatives of the CPV and KPA served.

The command and control of Korean forces, operating at the front, remained under the command of the Peoples Army. A representative from the Peoples Army was located in the headquarters of the CPV forces. In some army and individual corps headquarters of the CPV there were also representatives from the Korean command who were essentially liaison officers.

Starting on 25 October the leading units of the 13^th CPV Group Army, located on line west of Uznan – Sanwontong – north of Hichen – Sangoye – Wonpunni, entered into combat with American and South Korean forces and actively took part in halting the enemy offensive along that line.

By the end of the day on 28 October the force grouping of troops was as follows. On the right bank of the Taerkong River to Kosandong were the formations of the I US Corps, against whom the forces of the 1^st KPA Group Army were defending. Northwest of Uznan, which was covered by the lead units of the 1^st ROK Infantry Division, were the units of the 39^th CPV Army. In the Bugdin region and to the northeast were the operating forces of the 40^th CPV Army, which had halted the offensive by the 6^th ROK Infantry Division. The formations of the 38^th CPV Army, having arrived in the area north of Hichen, halted further movement by the units of the 8^th ROK Infantry Division. The 42^nd CPV Army, halting the offensive by the 3^rd ROK and Capital Infantry Divisions, was fighting along the line Sinpun – north of Sangoye – Wonpunni.

In reserve the CPV command held its 50^th CPV and 66^th CPV Armies, which were moving from the Antung region in the direction of Tonju. The 148^th CPV Infantry Division of the 50^th CPV Army was concentrated on Tsinan .[2] In the Sakju area and southeast were concentrated the 1^st, 2^nd and 8^th CPV Artillery Divisions. Beside these forces in Korea , the forces of the 9^th CPV Group Army were also moving into the country.

Along the east coast the formations of the I ROK Corps were chasing the remnants of the 2^nd KPA Group Army to the north. Along this direction the X US Corps had two divisions in the Hamhung area, which had been dropped in at Wonsan and Hamhung after moving by sea from South Korea .

For that reason, by 28 October the Unified Command of the CPV and KPA deployed 16 infantry divisions directly at the front or in the near rear areas, as well as three artillery divisions, one tank and one mechanized division. Beside that, there were six more infantry divisions allocated as reserves (not counting the forces of the 9^th CPV Group Army.)

The American and South Korean forces north of the 38^th Parallel had 11 infantry divisions (six of which were South Korean), one infantry brigade, and one airborne regiment with reinforcements. Four infantry divisions and one infantry brigade were in the army reserve and deployed south of the 38^th Parallel. These formations were conducting combat operations against Korean partisans.

The overall force ratios of the sides at the end of October are shown in Table 7.

From Table 7 it can be seen that with the entry into the war of the CPV the force ratio in personnel, while insignificant, was always in favor of the Chinese Volunteers and the Peoples Army. But at the same time the numbers and quality of combat technology (artillery, tanks and aviation) remained superior on the side of the enemy.

With the goal of terminating further movement by American and South Korean forces towards the border of the PRC, the Unified Command decided to launch a counterstrike against the enemy force grouping that was breaking through in the Uznan, Sanwontong, and Hichen areas. Preparations for the counterstrike were carried out on the march as the 13^th CPV Group Army assembled in the northern regions of the DPRK.

Per their plan, the forces had to launch a strike from the Techyon arfea and north of Hichen in the general direction of Nonbatong, destroy the enemy in the areas of Uznan, Hichen, north of Kudangdon, and move to the Chongchon River line.

In accordance with the concept of the operation, the forces received the following missions:

The 39^th CPV Army was ordered to launch a strike from the area north of Techyon in the direction of Nonbatong, meeting up with the 38^th CPV Army and together crushing the 1^st, 6^th and 8^th ROK Infantry Divisions. The 38^th CPV Army had to advance from the Hichen area in the direction of Nonbatong.

The forces of the 40^th CPV Army received orders to simply hold the enemy forces along the line Uznan – Sanwontong and then go on the offensive in a southeasterly direction.

To support the left flank of the 38^th CPV Army, the 125^th CPV Infantry Divisioon was detached from the 42^nd CPV Army, which had to advance from the Sinpung area towards Kundangdon. The 124^th CPV Infantry Division of this army had the mission of advancing in the direction of Orichyon. The 1^st KPA Group Army, defending along that indicated line, had to not permit the forces of the I US Corps move in the direction of Tongju – Sinuiju . With a goal of reinforcing the defense on this direction, the Unified Command decided to concentrate the 66^th CPV Army in the rear area of the 1^st KPA Group Army.

For launching the counterstrike against the three South Korean infantry divisions, ten infantry divisions were assembled that gave them a three-to-one numerical superiority over the enemy.

Starting on the morning of 29 October, the 39^th CPV Army began its offensive. Inflicting serious losses on the 1^st ROK Infantry Division in the Uznan area, it chased its units in a southerly direction, took Uznan and by the end of the day on 3 November had moved to a line on the southern slopes of the Hyancha-san Mountains and Kandong, where they ran into stiff resistance by the 1^st US Cavalry Division which had been sent to the front.

The 40^th CPV Army, which went on the offensive on 30 October in the area southeast of Sanwontong, destroyed up to two regiments of the 6^th ROK Infantry Division and, developing their success in the direction of Nonbatong, by 3 November took the line Sankudong – Tonsong. The 118^th CPV Infantry Division of this army, together with the 148^th CPV Infantry Division of the 50^th CPV Army, surrounded and destroyed the 7^th Infantry Regiment of the 6^th ROK Infantry Division in the area of Kodan, which had been moving from Chyosan to the south.

The 38^th CPV Army, which went on the offensive on 29 October, chased the enemy from the Hichen area, inflicting heavy casualties on the units of the 8^th ROK Infantry Division and, continuing to develop their success in a southwesterly direction, by 3 November had taken the line Chachak – Bawon. Moving up to 60 kilometers, the forces of the army were deep in the rear area of the I US Corps. The 125^th CPV Infantry Division of the 42^nd CPV Army took the city of Tokchyon .

On the Hamhung direction, the 124^th and 126^th CPV Infantry Divisions of the 42^nd CPV Army, going on the offensive and tightly holding on to the enemy as they moved south, fought with units of the 3^rd ROK Infantry Division and the 1^st Marine Division in the area of Orichyon.

On the Sinuiju direction, the weakened units of the 1^st KPA Group Army were not able to put up a stiff resistance to the I US Corps, and were forced to retreat in a northwesterly direction.

By 2 November the American forces had reached the line Tonnim, Munsu-san Mountain – Chennondong – Kusong – Sindandong, where they stopped to deploy their forces along this line against the 66^th CPV Army. They did not have the forces to break through into Sinuiju , as well as in conjunction with the threatened encirclement of their forces northwest of Bakchong the UN forces command decided that on 3 November they would have to being withdrawing the I US Corps to the Chongchon River . The forces of the 1^st KPA Group Army and the 66^th CPV Army began to follow the enemy with limited forces. In this fashion the units of the I US Corps, covered by a rear guard, withdrew to the area of Anju. In order to not permit further advances by the Chinese Volunteers in a southerly direction, the enemy brought up his reserves into this area – the 2^nd US and 7^th ROK Infantry Divisions, which were moved to the line Kechyon – Tokchyon.

The forces of the 13^th CPV Group Army and the 1^st KPA Group Army, continuing to advance in a southerly direction, drove back the American and South Korean forces to the Chongchon River and on 5 November took the line from north of Anju to north of Kechyon to Tokchyon and then Nyonwon, where they ran into organized enemy resistance. By this time, having expended all of their material resources, the 1^st KPA Group Army began to show real needs for provisions and ammunition. The Unified Command decided to terminate further advances, so that they could strengthen the successes they had achieved and prepare their forces for a new offensive operation.

For that reason, as a result of the combat operations between 29 October and 5 November the forces of the 13^th CPV Group Army and the 1^st KPA Group Army had corrected the threat of an enemy breakthrough on the Sinuiju direction to the borders of the PRC. In these operations heavy losses were inflicted on the 1^st, 6^th and 8^th ROK Infantry Divisions. During the course of the operations the forces captured more than 4,000 enemy soldiers and officers, 120 guns and mortars, 400 vehicles and many other items of weapons and equipment.

The overall depth achieved by the offensive was around 45-50 kilometers, with an average speed of movement of 5-6 kilometers per day.

It follows to stress that the conduct of the operation to destroy the enemy by the Unified Command in the areas of Unzan, Sanwontong, and Hichen did not meet its established goals. The destruction of the forces of the II ROK Corps did not take place. There was a delay in following the enemy by the 1^st KPA Group Army and 66^th CPV Army. This let the enemy retreat to the Chongchon River .

But at the same time the counterstrike, being the first offensive by the Chinese Peoples Volunteers against the Singman Rhee forces, showed that it was completely possible for them to crush well-equipped enemy forces, even when inferior to them in weaponry, but superior to them in morale and fighting spirit. This success made the belief in the possibility of victory over the enemy by the CPV and KPA even stronger.

Believing that they had halted the offensive by the CPV and KPA and underestimating their combat capability, the American command once again prepared to renew the offensive on all fronts.

Starting on the morning of 6 November, and without regrouping and preparing on the directions of Tokchyon and Hichen, the forces of the II ROK Corps went on the offensive, and on 8 November the formations of the I US Corps went on the offensive on the Sinuiju direction.

During the first days the forces of the CPV and KPA put up stiff resistance to Un forces along the lines they occupied. But at the same time they were unable to halt the pace of the enemy. On the Sinuiju direction the I US Corps succeeded in forcing the Chongchon River in the Anju area and during six days of hard combat with the formations of the 1^st KPA Group Army and the 39^th and 40^th CPV Armies moved forward about 6-10 kilometers. On 13 November the enemy took the line of hills along the Taerkong River , Bakchong, Inri and north of Bawon. On the Hichen direction the formations of the 38^th and 42^nd CPV Armies likewise were forced to withdraw to the north. On 13 November the formations of these armies fought along the line north of Tanpori – Tokchyon – Mensan. The enemy, using all his technological and fire superiority, drove all his efforts towards crushing the forces of the CPV and KPA. The Unified decided to withdraw the main body of the 1^st KPA Group Army and the 13^th CPV Group Army to the line Kouksan – Panhyong – north of Techyon – Unzan – Sinfundong – Nyonwon in order to take up a more advantageous flanking position, keep the enemy moving along mountain roads and then, after completing the assembly of the forces of the 9^th CPV Group Army in the area of Tonmungori and south, go over to the counteroffensive on the Pyongyang and Hamhung directions.

By the night of 14 November the CPV and KPA forces began to retreat under the protection of a rear guard.

With the goal of moving to the northern border of the DPRK, on 14 November the American command renewed the offensive on all fronts. The formations of I US Corps and the II ROK Corps, overcoming resistance by the units of the 1^st KPA Group Army and the 39^th and 40^th CPV Armies, had moved to a point 5-7 kilometers northeast of Bakchong and took Neybin by 20 November. Meeting stiff resistance from the Chinese Volunteers, the forces of the main American force grouping halted their offensive and reorganized their forces, with which they planned to continue the offensive along this direction.

On the Hamhung direction and the east coast, the enemy, fighting with two fresh divisions from the X US Corps, broke through the defense of the units of the 42^nd CPV Army and the 2^nd KPA Group Army in the area of Orichyon and Pukchyon and continued the offensive in a northerly direction. By 20 November the 1^st Marine Division had moved into the area north of Hagaru-ri, and on 24 November the 7^th US Infantry Division had moved to the Sino-Korean border in the area of Hesandin. The 3^rd ROK Infantry Division fought with units of the 4^th KPA Army in the area of Hemun. Operating along the east coast, enemy forces received continuous fire support from the warships of the unified UN fleet.

On these directions the American and South Korean forces moved 60-80 kilometers to the north and northwest and took a number of important settlements in the northeastern part of the DPRK.

By this time the formations of the 9^th CPV Group Army had finished assembling in the areas southwest of the Chanjing Reservoir.

On the Hichen direction the American command had, in order to take the cities of Bugdin and Hichen, committed the reserves of IX US Corps (the 2^nd and 25^th US Infantry Divisions) and, after regrouping their forces, began the offensive once again on the morning of 24 November with the forces of the I US and IX US and also the II ROK Corps.

As a result, the offensive by the American and South Korean forces on the Sinuiju and Hichen directions succeeded in driving 15-20 kilometers to the north and by the end of the day on 24 November had taken the line east of Tonju – south of Techyon and Uznan – Kundandong – Nyonwon. By noon on 25 November the Singman Rhee forces, after an unsuccessful attempt to get their offensive to develop in the western sector of the front, went over to the defense along their line of achievement.

For that reason, during the course of 20 days of hard combat the CPV and KPA had succeeded in not only halting the offensive along the Sinuiju and Hichen directions, but had created the conditions for preparing for their own offensive operation.

By 25 November, the UN forces were in the following positions. On the Pyongyang direction, the I US Corps with three infantry divisions and one infantry brigade was defending a line from east of the outskirts of Tonju to Kosandong; the 1^st US Cavalry Division of this corps compromised the corps reserve and was deployed in the area of Sunchong. The IX US Corps with two infantry divisions occupied the line from Kosandong to east of Kundandong. The II ROK Corps with three infantry divisions was maintaining the line from Samindong to south of Tokhwa, with the 6^th ROK Infantry Division in reserve in the area of Tokchyon.

On the Hamhung direction, the X US Corps with units of the 1^st Marine Division was maintaining the area around Hagaru-ri. The 7^th US Infantry Division from this corps had moved to the Sino-Korean border in the area of Hesandin. The 3^rd US Infantry Division was in reserve at Hamhung.

Along the east coast was the I ROK Corps with two infantry divisions and units of the Capital Infantry Division, holding the area of Nanam and fighting for Chengjin; the 3^rd ROK Infantry Division had taken Paegam.

The operational reserve of the American command consisted of the 2^nd, 5^th, 9^th, and 11^th ROK Infantry Divisions, the 29^th British Infantry Brigade, and the independent Turkish Infantry Brigade, the 17^th and 30^th Independent ROK Infantry Regiments, the 187^th RCT, the 5^th RCT from Hawaii , and up to ten independent battalions.

The forces composing the enemy reserve were simultaneously carrying out the mission of rear area security of objects and lines of communication and carrying out combat against partisan detachments.

Overall, the UN ground forces numbered 10 ROK infantry divisions and 7 US infantry divisions, two British and one Turkish infantry brigades, four independent infantry regiments, and up to ten independent battalions presented by different governments. Beside that, the forces also had four independent tank battalions, 14 independent artillery battalions, and a significant number of antiaircraft and engineer units and special technical subunits of the reserve of the high command. The average strength of a South Korean division was 11-12,000 men, and that of the American divisions 17-18,000. The 1^st Marine Division numbered nearly 23,000 men. The British and Turkish infantry brigades, as well as the American 187^th RCT, each numbered around 6,000 men. Overall the UN ground forces had around 360,000 men, 2,300 guns and mortars, and up to 1,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces.

The UN aviation at this time numbered about 1,600 combat aircraft and transports.[5] Having complete air superiority, they launched systematic strikes against assembly areas and the combat order of forces, rear area lines of communication, supply bases, river crossings over the Yalu River , the Supung hydroelectric power station, airfields and other important objects in the rear areas of the CPV and KPA forces.

Along the east and west coasts of Korea , naval forces from the combined UN fleet kept up close cooperation with ground forces with their more than 170 warships, including 15 major warships (battleships, cruisers, and aircraft carriers). In order to support fleet operations, there were more than 100 auxiliary vessels in its makeup and more than 400 carrier-based aircraft. The primary effort of the fleet was directed towards fire support for ground forces operating along the coasts, blockading the coasts and destroying troops, the destruction of lines of communication and other objects in the rear areas of the CPV and KPA forces.

The CPV and KPA forces, which had reorganized at the same time they had withdrawn to the mountains, were located in the following areas by 25 November: the 50^th CPV Army was located from west of Tonju to Panhyon; the 66^th CPV Army, from Techyon to Unzan.

In the rear areas of these armies, in the area of Kunson and west, were assembled the 1^st KPA Group Army forces that had been weakened by continuous combat. The 8^th KPA Infantry Division was concentrated in the area of Chyonsan to cover the crossings over the Yalu River .

Along the front from Uznan to Kopewon was the operational area of the 39^th CPV Army; to its left, from Hengancham to Mount Hyonzebyon , was the 40^th CPV Army. Along the line from Samkori to Onchanni were the 38^th and 42^nd CPV Armies.

In the area northwest of Sanchanri were assembled the remnants of the 2^nd, 4^th, 5^th and 7^th KPA Infantry Divisions of the former 2^nd KPA Group Army that had been able to escape from the enemy’s rear area.[6]

In the area north and west of Hagaru-ri were the final assembly areas for the 9^th CPV Group Army.

The 20^th CPV Army took up starting positions in the area of Sinphori, with one division on line southwest of Sanchanri.

North of Hagaru-ri, in the area of Toksil-ri, was the 27^th CPV Army. The 26^th CPV Army was assembled in the area of Upsan-ri.

The makeup of the 13^th and 9^th CPV Group Armies included 30 infantry divisions (each one averaging 10-11,000 men in strength), four howitzer artillery divisions, one antiaircraft artillery division, and two engineer regiments. Overall the forces of the Chinese Volunteers, together with their service subunits, railway units, and rear services establishments numbered 531,500 men.

Along the east coast, in the area of the port and city of Chengjin , the enemy continued to be resisted by the weakened formations of the 4^th KPA Army.

The main command of the KPA took decisive measures to strengthen the combat capability of the 1^st, 2^nd and 4^th KPA Armies and form new reserve formations. In the area of Kangae they continued to man and train the forces of the 3^rd and 5^th KPA Armies. On the territory of the northeastern section of China they continued to man and train the formations of the 6^th, 7^th and 8^th KPA Armies.

The 17 divisions and one brigade of the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th and 5^th KPA Armies numbered 103,000 men. The average strength of a division was 5,500 men.

The overall strength of the CPV and KPA was more than 600,000 men. These forces had 2,492 guns and mortars larger than 76mm caliber and up to 67 medium tanks and self-propelled guns.

The extreme shortage of aircraft in the CPV meant they were only specifically able to cover the crossings over the Yalu River in the Antung area. The KPA aviation consisted of all of 30 combat aircraft, which were used for training flying personnel.

There were only several small schooners in the naval forces, which were used to protect the coasts.

For that reason, the overall ratio of personnel and numbers of divisions was in the favor of the Unified Command, and the numbers of artillery and mortars were nearly even; but qualitatively the artillery and mortars were in the favor of the enemy. In this the UN forces also had absolute superiority in tanks and complete air and naval supremacy.

With the goal of crushing the American and South Korean forces on the Pyongyang and Hamhung directions, the Unified Command decided to carry out a counteroffensive.

The overall concept of the counteroffensive was as follows. The forces of the 13^th CPV Group Army and the 1^st KPA Army[7] had to make several strikes on the Pyongyang direction in the general direction of Anju with the goal of crushing the enemy I US and IX US and II ROK Corps in the vicinity of Tonju, Kundandong, Nyonwon, and Ponwon-ri. Ultimately they would advance in a southerly direction and take Pyongyang .

On the Hamhung direction, the forces of the 9^th CPV Group Army had to surround and annihilate the 1^st Marine Division in the area of Hagaru-ri, move to the Hamhung area and cut off the withdrawal routes of the American and South Korean forces operating in the Hesandin, Paegam and Chengju areas.

In consideration of the difficulties of an offensive in the winter and in mountainous terrain, under conditions of a roadless environment, as well as with only a five day reserve of provisions and ammunition being carried with the forces, the Unified Command planned the operation to only penetrate to a depth of 50-70 kilometers on both the Pyongyang and Hamhung directions.

In accordance with the decisions the forces command assigned the following mission tasks.

On the Pyongyang direction the 50^th and 66^th CPV Armies were ordered to simply hold their line for the first day. On the second day of the operation they would begin the offensive in the direction of Anju and in cooperation with the 39^th and 40^th CPV Armies crush the enemy in the Bakchon area, taking care to not let him withdraw to the Chongchon River .

The 39^th CPV Army, in the area east of Uznan, and the 40^th CPV Army, in the area of Mount Hyenjebyon , had to advance in the direction of Neybin – Anju with the goal of inflicting damage on the IX US Corps units and getting into the rear areas of the I US Corps.

The 38^th and 42^nd CPV Armies were ordered to strike in the direction of Nyonwon – Tokchyon and destroy the main body of the II ROK Corps, then, developing the offensive in the direction of Ponwon-ri, move into the rear area of the IX US Corps operating north of the Chongchon River. The 38^th CPV Army had to start its offensive one day after the 42^nd CPV Army, just as the units of the II ROK Corps began to withdraw.

Each of the armies in the 13^th CPV Group Army held one infantry division back as their second echelon forces.

The 1^st KPA Army was to remain in the area west and northwest of Kuson, replace its personnel, weapons and equipment losses, and then operate with the second echelon.

The 2^nd and 5^th KPA Armies, located in the area of Kangae and northwest of Sanchan-ri in reserve, were planned for use on the Pyongyang direction by the Unified Command.

For that reason, on the 160 kilometers of the front from Tonju to Onchanni on the Pyongyang direction a strike force grouping of 29 infantry divisions and one mechanized division had been created.

On the Hamhung direction the 20^th and 27^th CPV Armies of the 9^th CPV Group Army, part of whose forces were covering from the south and east and striking from the west and north, had to surround and destroy the forces of the 1^st Marine Division in the Hagaru-ri area. Ultimately the forces of both armies would receive the mission to advance on Hamhung and cut off the withdrawal of the American and South Korean forces operating in the northeastern part of Korea . The 26^th CPV Army, which was located in the Upsan-ri area (second echelon), was designated for use in developing the offensive in the Hamhung direction. On this direction, the Unified Command held the 3^rd KPA Army in reserve in the Kangae area.

Overall, along this 110 kilometer stretch of front from Onchanni to Mount Chyongchen-san there were 15 infantry divisions and one tank division.

The correlation of forces on these directions at the start of the counteroffensive is presented in Table 9.

From Table 9 it can be seen that the forces of the Unified Command on both directions were superior to those of the enemy in number of divisions, insignificantly different in the amount of artillery but nearly without any tanks.

On the night of 26 November the 40^th, 38^th and 42^nd CPV Armies went over onto the offensive on the Pyongyang direction. The forces on the right wing of the 13^th CPV Group Army – the 50^th, 66^th and 39^th CPV Armies, which had to go over to the offensive one day later, made use of the intervals between the enemy units to slip specially-trained reconnaissance-diversionary groups into his rear areas, in order to disrupt command and control, interfere with the operations of American forces and work in their rear area. With this goal in mind, the newly reformed but reduced manning 5^th and 7^th KPA Infantry Divisions of the 2^nd KPA Army were sent in on those directions.

The mighty blow struck by the 38^th and 42^nd CPV Armies against the units of the II ROK Corps caused confusion among the Singman Rhee forces and their command lost control. The enemy was forced to begin a hasty and disorganized retreat to the south, in the direction of Nyonwon and Mensan.

In two days of offensive combat the forces of the 40^th, 38^th and 42^nd CPV Armies destroyed the main body of the II ROK Corps, inflicted heavy losses on the units of the 2^nd US Infantry Division of the IX US Corps and, moving south up to 30 kilometers, took the cities of Nyonwon, Tokchyon, and Mensan. By the end of the day on 27 November the forces of these armies had moved to the line Kudandong – Tokchyon – Mensan.

Together with the threat created to the retreat of the II ROK Coprps south of Bawon, the command of the UN armed forces, in order to assist this corps, began to regroup the 1^st US Cavalry Division from Sunchong in an area southwest of Tokchyon. Simultaneously they began to move to reinforce the 29^th British Infantry Brigade and the Turkish Infantry Brigade with a heavy tank battalion.

On the night of 27 November the 50^th, 66^th and 39^th CPV Armies went over to the offensive. The forces of the I and IX US Corps, fighting off encirclement, began to withdraw under the protection of a rear guard and with heavy aviation support towards the Chongchon River . On the night of 28 November the forces of the 9^th CPV Group Army went over onto the offensive.

The 13^th CPV Group Army, tracking the units of the I and IX US Corps and the remnants of the destroyed formations of the II ROK Corps, moved to a line of the bank of the Taerkong River – Bakchong – Neybin – Inri – Bawon – Toryonni – Pukchan – Hyanneri by 28 November.

With the goal of encircling the enemy in the area north of Anju the command of the 13^th CPV Group Army amended the missions for its armies on 28 November: the 50^th and 66^th CPV Armies were ordered to destroy enemy units on the northwest bank of the Chongchon River; the 39^th and 40^th CPV Armies were given the mission of advancing in the direction of Kechyon – Anju; the 38^th and 40^th CPV Armies had to develop the offensive in the direction of Sunchong and Sukchen in order to cut off the retreat of the American forces in a southerly direction. In order to protect the left flank from possible enemy attacks the 42^nd CPV Army was to allocate one division to advance from Sonchong towards Pyongyang .

On 29-30 November the forces of the 13^th CPV Group Army, overcoming the resistance by the enemy rear guard and not giving them the opportunity to set up an intermediate defensive line, continued to develop the successful offensive on all fronts. The 50^th and 66^th CPV Armies moved up to the Chongchon River and from its bank to Hatem; the 39^th, 40^th and 42^nd CPV Armies overcame resistance by the 25^th and 2^nd US Infantry Divisions and the 1^st US Cavalry Division, inflicted heavy losses on the Turkish Infantry Brigade, and by the end of the day on 30 November had moved to the line Kechyon – east of Sunchong – Sonchong. The enemy, covering with part of his forces along the line Sunchong – Sukchen, skillfully broke away and withdrew his main body to the Pyongyang area.

The remnants of the II ROK Corps, having lost up to 60% of their strength and equipment, were forced to break off combat on 30 November and move to the 38^th Parallel to replace personnel and restore themselves.

In light of the shortages of ammunition, provisions and winter uniforms among their troops, as well as the necessity to take time to rest them and restore their combat order, the command of the CPV made the decision on 1 December to halt the offensive of the 13^th CPV Group Army for two or three days. Pursuit of the withdrawing enemy was left to the forces of the 39^th and 42^nd CPV Armies.

For that reason, as a result of the five-day offensive battle the forces of the 13^th CPV Group Army inflicted significant damage on the forces of the I and IX US Corps, destroyed the II ROK Corps and the Turkish Infantry Brigade, and, driving the enemy forces back from the line Anju – south of Kechyon – Sunchong – Sonchong, had driven 35 to 80 kilometers in a southerly direction at an average speed of advance of 7-16 kilometers per day.

The American and South Korean forces during this time suffered more than 23,000 officers and men killed, wounded or captured. The 13^th CPV Group Army took as trophies 170 field guns, 135 mortars, around 400 machine guns, many automatic weapons, rifles and ammunition, 53 tanks and 1,950 trucks.

This new combat success by the Chinese volunteers brought their morale spirit even higher and strengthened their faith in victory.

During the period 1-5 December the forces of the 13^th CPV Group Army resupplied with ammunition and provisions, and then prepared to advance. The 1^st KPA Army was moved from the Kunsong area to Bakchon.

At the same time, by using sectors of the front not occupied by the enemy, formations of the 2^nd and 5^th KPA Armies moved in the direction of Tokchyon, Yandok and Chorwon into the rear of the American and South Korean forces, where they had the mission of opening partisan operations in the area east and southeast of Pyongyang.

Two infantry divisions from the 39^th and 42^nd CPV Armies had been allocated to track the retreating enemy forces and by 4 December they had reached the line Sukchen – Namsan. Not encountering any enemy resistance, by 6 December these divisions had moved to Pyongyang and Kandong, from which the American and South Korean forces had begun to withdraw.

Seeing that the main body of the 13^th CPV Group Army could not prepare to start its offensive in that time frame, the command of the Chinese Volunteers gave them additional time until 15 December to prepare.

The UN forces, recognizing that the CPV forces had broken off their pursuit on the Pyongyang direction, made an unhindered retreat to the 38^th Parallel by 18 December. In this the 2^nd US Infantry Division made a move by naval transport from Nampo to Inchon between 4-8 December. The retreating forces joined with the 2^nd, 5^th and 9^th ROK Infantry Divisions brought up from the depths of the rear area to form a defense along the 38^th Parallel.

During the period 12-16 December the forces of the 13^th CPV Group Army, after making night marches, moved into the area east of Pyongyang . The 1^st KPA Army moved its primary forces into the area southwest of Pyongyang and moved to organize the defense of the west coast.

On the Hamhung direction, the forces of the 20^th and 27^th CPV Armies of the 9^th CPV Group Army went over onto the offensive on the night of 28 November and carried out combat operations in the areas of Hagaru-ri, Yudamni and Senunri-igu with units of the 1^st Marine Division.

The 20^th CPV Army, driving towards the enemy from the west with one division covering the side towards Sanchan-ri, where units from the 3^rd US Infantry Division were arriving at the same time, launched its main strike from the southwest towards Hagaru-ri. By the morning of 28 November the army’s right flank had moved into the areas south and southwest of Hagaru-ri, and for this reason cut off the railway lines and roads connecting this area with Hamhung.

The 27^th CPV Army, with one regiment from the 81^st CPV Infantry Division covering it in the Kaeko-ri area to the east, launched a strike on Yudamni and Sasuri from the north. By nightfall the forces of the army had their right flank and center push bac the enemy for 3-5 kilometers, and their left flank had joined up with units of the 20^th CPV Army in the vicinity of Hagaru-ri. In the Hagaru-ri area these formations had encircled the forces of the 5^th and 7^th Regiments of the 1^st Marine Division.

On 28 November the command of the Chinese Volunteers turned the attention to the commander of the 9^th CPV Group Army to the fact that the 1^st Regiment and 11^th Artillery Regiment of the 1^st Marine Division, located in the area of Orichen, could come to the aid of the encircled units north of Hagaru-ri. Therefore it would be necessary for the 20^th CPV Army to more assuredly moved to tighten the encirclement from the south, as well as commit the forces of the 26^th CPV Army, which at that time was in the second echelon of the 9^th CPV Group Army, in the direction of Orichen. But at the same time, the significant distance of the 26^th CPV Army from that area and the lack of transport to move the forces did not permit it to carry out that maneuver in a short period of time.

Recognizing the fact that the units of the 20^th CPV Army were not able to successfully strengthen their hold on designated lines, the 1^st Regiment and specialized units from the 1^st Marine Division, and the 31^st Infantry Regiment from the 7^th US Infantry Division, brought up from the area of Pukchyon, moved under heavy artillery and air support and by the end of the day on 28 November had broken through to the Hagaru-ri area from the south. Simultaneously the Americans immediately moved the trucks from the 32^nd Infantry Regiment of the 7^th US Infantry Division to that area from the area of Hesandin to assist the encircled American forces.

After the breakthrough by the 1^st Regiment and the 31^st Infantry Regiment into the Hagaru-ri area from the south, the 20^th CPV Army succeeded in restoring the southern sector of the front on the night of 29 November. Now the entire 1^st Marine Division and one regiment from the 7^th US Infantry Division were encircled. The number of encircled troops had now reached 25,000.

During the day on 29 November the encircled enemy forces attacked with one infantry regiment with tank support and struck up from the south in the direction of Sanpyon-ri in an attempt to free the encircled units, but after taking heavy losses, was thrown back in a southerly direction. Only 20 enemy tanks succeeded in breaking through the combat order of the Chinese volunteers and moved to the Hagaru-ri area.

During 29-30 November units of the 3^rd US Infantry Division attempted to assist the encircled forces, driving from the Sanchan-ri area. They repeatedly made attempts to move to the north into the rear area of the 20^th CPV Army. But at the same time none of these attacks met with success.

In continuing to destroy the encircled enemy forces, the forces of the 20^th and 27^th CPV Armies cut the encircled 1^st US Marine Division into isolated parts. In the Yudamni area, they encircled the 5^th and 7^th Regiments, and in the Hagaru-ri area the 1^stRegiment and special units of the division. To provide help to the encircled forces, the American command allocated nearly half of the combat aircraft that they had operating in Korea . The enemy aviation launched bombing and group attack strikes against the Chinese Volunteers, inflicting significant losses and severely limiting their combat operations during daylight hours. American transport aviation, using the ice on the Changjin Reservoir itself as an airfield, provided continuous supplies of ammunition and provisions to the encircled forces, as well as flying out 500-700 wounded troops on a daily basis.

At this point in time, the 1^st Marine Division and the 31^st Regiment of the 7^th US Infantry Division had lost around 8,600 men killed or wounded and up to 2,500 taken prisoner. The Chinese Volunteers had taken as captured 150 guns and mortars, more than 100 machine guns, 9 tanks, 430 trucks and many other items of military goods.

The disadvantageous turn of events on the enemy’s Pyongyang direction, as well as the destruction of X US Corps and the threat caused by the movement of the 9^th CPV Group Army towards Hamhung forced the enemy to terminate the offensive of the I ROK Corps on 29 November along the east coast of the DPRK, and on 1 December it began a hasty withdrawal of its forces in a southerly direction. In this the ROK Capital Division left Chengjin to the area of the port of Sengjin under heavy artillery support. The 3^rd ROK Infantry Division followed it, under the cover of a rear guard, and with aviation support left Paegam for Kil’chu. Units of the 7^th US Infantry Division withdrew from the Hesandin area to Pukchyon and Hinnam.

Units of the 4^th KPA Army, following the enemy, gradually moved along the coast in a southwesterly direction and it was only north of Kil’chu on 6 December that they encountered resistance from subunits of the 3^rd ROK Infantry Division that were covering the retreat.

Starting on 1 December, the American units encircled north of Hagaru-ri made numerous attempts to break out of the encirclement to the south with the use of heavy air support. At the same time, units of the 3^rd and 7^th US Infantry Divisions as before attempted to break through from Sanchari, Orichen and Sinhin to assist the encircled forces.

On 4 December, the 5^th and 7^th Regiments which were encircled in the Yudamni area, as the result of a protracted and violent battle, succeeded in breaking through the encirclement created by the 59^th CPV Infantry Division of the 20^th CPV Army, moved to the Hagaru-ri area, and join up with units of the 1^st Marine Division. With this increase in their forces in the Hagaru-ri area, the enemy had an increasing ability to break out of the encirclement to the south.

With the goal of not permitting units to break out in a southerly direction, on 5 December the 26^th CPV Army from the second echelon of the 9^th CPV Group Army was committed to action, starting an offensive in the direction of Yudamni – Hagaru-ri. With this goal in mind the 1^st and 3^rd KPA Infantry Divisions of the 3^rd KPA Army received the mission to advance from Tonmungori in the direction of Sohondae – Sinhin – Orichen and then into the rear area of the X US Corps.

On 9 December, a significant group of enemy forces advancing from the south succeeded in taking the pass south of Koto-ri and part of the forces, mainly consisting of motorized infantry and tanks, broke through the combat order of the 20^th CPV Army and moved into the area south of Hagaru-ri. Simultaneously, gathering all their remaining forces, the units of the 1^st Marine Division, with heavy air support, struck south from Hagaru-ri to rupture the front of the encirclement and join with the units advancing from the south. By the morning of 10 December the destroyed remnants of units from the 1^st Marine and 7^th US Infantry Divisions had left the encirclement and under heavy air cover moved to the Hamhung area.

By this time the I ROK Corps, having evacuated its units by sea from the port of Sengjin to the south, had its main body concentrated in the Hamhung area and moved to load units onto transports for transfer to the areas south of the 38^th Parallel.

The X US Corps, protected by units of the 3^rd US and 3^rd ROK Infantry Divisions along lines east, north and west of Hamhung, and with the offensive of the Chinese Volunteers stopped by aggressive air operations, began to start evacuation of its units from Hamhung and Hinnam to south Korea and the ports of Phohan, Ul’san and Pusan.

The forces of the 26^th and 27^th CPV Armies allocated to chase the enemy, not possessing any antiaircraft means, and taking heavy losses from American aviation, testing them with a shortage of artillery and ammunition, could not interfere with the withdrawal or the evacuation of UN forces from Hamhung to the south.

On 15 December the enemy forces left Hamhung and moved to the area of the port south of Hinnam, where under cover of a large number of aircraft they were loaded onto naval transports and evacuated to

south Korea

by 24 December.

On 16 December the leading units of the 26^th and 27^th CPV Armies reached Hamhung. The main bodies of the 26^th and 27^th CPV Armies at this time were concentrated in the area northwest and west of Hamhung. The 20^th CPV Army remained in the Hagaru-ri area to replace its losses and put its units back in order. The forces of the 3^rd KPA Army moved into the area west of Wonsan on 18 December and began to prepare for a new offensive.

Simultaneously with the offensive by the CPV forces on the Pyongyang and Hamhung directions, the formations of the 2^nd and 5^th KPA Armies commenced active operations in the enemy’s rear area along with partisan detachments from the local population. By carrying out raids on enemy columns and garrisons, destroying railway junctions, crossings, bridges, storehouses, airfields and other enemy works, the forces and the partisan detachments inflicted significant losses on the enemy.

After the retreat of the UN forces to the 38^th Parallel, the main bodies of the 2^nd and 5^th KPA Armies were concentrated in the areas of Kimchong, Yenchen, Hwachen, Kumhwa and Sibili.

For that reason, as a result of the counteroffensive by the CPV and KPA on the Pyongyang and Hamhung directions the enemy had unacceptably heavy losses inflicted upon him. The formations of the II ROK Corps, the Turkish Infantry Brigade, and the 1^st Marine Division lost from 40 to 70% of their personnel. Significant losses (up to 30%) were taken by the individual units of the 7^th and 3^rd US Infantry Divisions of the X US Corps, as well as individual units of the I and IX US Corps. Overall enemy losses in this operation were more than 30,000 men, hundreds of guns and mortars, thousands of trucks and many other items of weaponry and equipment.

The success of the initial CPV and KPA counteroffensive under harsh winter conditions and without sufficient levels of supply to the forces of provisions, ammunition and warm clothing ended with the complete liberation of the DPRK from American and South Korean forces.

For the time that the 13^th CPV Group Army and the 1^st KPA Army found themselves in the Pyongyang area, they replaced their losses in personnel and various types of materiel means. Using the available transport and special subunits of bearers formed from a number of soldiers and the civilian population, the Unified Command provided its soldiers with cartridges, shells and provisions for a period of 4-5 days.

In order to ensure it could reliably hold the 38^th Parallel line, the Unified Command decided to prepare a new offensive operation. During the second half of December 1950 the main body of forces of the CPV And KPA began to regroup with the goal of taking up starting positions for the offensive.

On 30 December the 1^st KPA Army took up its starting positions for the offensive in the Kaysen area.

By 29 December the 13^th CPV Group Army used the night to regroup in the areas east of Kaysen, Chongok, Hwachen, and Chorwon. The main body of forces (the 50^th, 39^th, 40^th and 38^th CPV Armies) was deployed on the Seoul direction and two armies (the 42^nd and 66^th) took up starting positions southwest of Hwachen for a strike against Kaphyon.

To the left of the 13^th CPV Group Army, in the area south of Hwachen, east of Indae, and Imdamni were the main body of the forces of the 2^nd and 5^th KPA Armies. The 3^rd KPA Army was sent into reserve on 25 December and concentrated in the area of Chorwon and Changdori.

By studying the great length of the coastline of the DPRK and the ability of the enemy to make a naval landing on either the west or east coasts, the Unified Command allocated the necessary numbers of troops for anti-landing defense. The 4^th KPA Army defended the west coast in the sector from Tonju to Nampo. The forces of the 9^th CPV Group Army, along with two infantry divisions and two brigades from the KPA defended the east coast in the Wonsan and Hamhung areas.

Out of the total of 41 infantry divisions, one mechanized division, one tank division, and six infantry brigades located in the DPRK, 32 divisions and two brigades were concentrated along the 38^th Parallel, or 63% of the available forces.

Beside these forces, deep in the rear area of the country the 6^th, 7^th and 8^th KPA Armies had finished manning, training and assembling.

The American and South Korean forces that had drawn back across the 38^th Parallel had strengthened their positions along the line Munsan – south of Chongdok – Simpori – Yayan.

In consideration of the movement of three South Korean infantry divisions from their reserve and the I ROK Corps up to the front line the density of the combat order of the enemy defenses was much heavier. The American command considered that they could hold this line, play for time, reform shattered units, bring up the reserves, and at the right moment once again begin the offensive.

In the sector from the banks of the Han River to Kahoosan was the I US Corps, with two divisions (25^th US and 1^st ROK) in the first echelon and one brigade (the 29^th British) as corps reserve in the area of Suwon .

The IX US Corps defended the belt from Kahoosan to Yongon, likewise with two divisions (the 6^th ROK and 24^th US) in its first echelon and one brigade (the 27^th British) as corps reserve in the Seoul area.

In the sector from Yongon to Kwandae the defense was composed of the newly created III ROK Corps (2^nd, 5^th and 8^th ROK Infantry Divisions). All of these divisions were deployed in a single echelon. The belt from Kwandae to Hadob was defended by the 3^rd ROK Infantry Division of the II ROK Corps. The 7^th ROK Infantry Division from this corps was in reserve in the area of Chungchen. In the sector from Hadob to Yayan the defense consisted of the 9^th ROK Infantry and the Capital Divisions of the I ROK Corps.

The army reserve consisted of the 1^st US Cavalry Division in the area of Kaphyon, the 2^nd US Infantry Division in the area of Chechong, and the independent Turkish Infantry Brigade in the area of Kanhwa. Overall the first echelon divisions of the army numbered 13 infantry divisions and three infantry brigades, with eight ROK and two US divisions directly in the first echelon. The width of the belts defended by these units were no more than 13-15 kilometers, and only in the belt of the IIK ROK Corps were the divisions not able to hold a solid defensive line; there they were extended to 20-25 kilometers.

Beside that, in deep reserve for the army was the X US Corps consisting of three divisions, deployed in these areas: the 1^st Marine Division and the 7^th US Infantry Division were at Kimchong and the 11^th ROK Infantry Division was concentrated at Kimsan and Chinan.

The characteristics of this enemy force grouping were such that their main body was concentrated on the Seoul direction. Here the first echelon forces were predominantly formed of South Korean troops.

The defensive positions of the American and South Korean forces along the 38^th Parallel consisted of old bunkers and dugouts which had been used by the forces in the course of observation. On the important directions, especially in the western sector, there were wood and earth firing positions. 200-300 meters forward of these positions were wire obstacles, small barriers and mine fields. Mining was carried out on the main roads to their front and also throughout the defensive zone. American units and subunits, in order to combat encirclement, created all around defenses of their positions. With the goal of defense the enemy on the 38^th Parallel did not have sufficient depth and had developed their engineer works comparatively poorly.

In the rear area of the enemy’s lines the local population had helped to build new defensive lines. The first of these ran along the south bank of the Han River, and the second along the line Kunsan – south of Taejon – Sanju – Andon. They also prepared the old defensive lines running through Taegu .

The concept of the Unified Command of the CPV and KPA towards their offensive operation was such that the striking forces would hit the enemy on a number of different directions and destroy his main body by cutting into parts. Ultimately, in case the enemy retreated, the offensive forces would take the capital of Korea – the city of Seoul , as well as the cities of Kaphyon and Chungchen.

The task placed before the main force grouping (the 50^th, 39^th, 40^th, and 38^th CPV Armies, a total of 12 infantry divisions) operating on the Seoul direction was to strike in the direction of Chongdok – Seoul and rupture the enemy’s defense and destroy the 1^st and 6^th ROK Infantry Divisions. Ultimately in case the enemy withdrew, they had to develop the offensive in a southerly direction and take the city of Seoul .

The 1^st KPA Army had the mission of advancing in the direction of Kaysen – Munsan, cut off the forces of the 25^th US Infantry Division, and supporting the right flank of the strike force grouping of the 13^th CPV Group Army, advancing in the direction of Chongdok – Seoul .

Overall, along a 65 kilometer front stretching from Hotokuri to Changdon there were 14 infantry divisions and one mechanized division, with a total of up to 1,200 guns and mortars and 26 tanks.[9]

In the belt of the defense where the strike force grouping would fall were four infantry divisions, three infantry brigades and an airborne regiment with the support of 600 guns and mortars and up to 290 tanks.[10]

On the direction of the main strike the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army had a superiority of manpower over the enemy of 2.5 to 1 and 2 to 1 in artillery. The superiority in the number of tanks and especially aviation was on the side of the UN forces.

An auxiliary strike would be launched in the direction of Kaphyon by the forces of the 42^nd and 66^th CPV Armies, which had the mission of destroying the 2^nd and 5^th ROK Infantry Divisions and taking Kaphyon and Chungchen. To support the left flank of this force grouping, one division of the 66^th CPV Army was allocated to take on that mission.

The 2^nd and 5^th KPA Armies received the mission to use part of their forces to cut off the forces of the 3^rd, 9^th and Capital ROK Infantry Divisions, strike with their main body from the area of Yangu in the direction of Honchen and destroy the 8^th and 7^th ROK Infantry Divisions and by that means support the offensive of the 42^nd and 66^th CPV Armies.

The 3^rd KPA Army was to remain in the area of Pyongkan as the reserve of the Unified Command.

At 1700 hours on 31 December the forces of the 13^th CPV Group Army and the 1^st, 2^nd and 5^th KPA Armies went over to the offensive, which caught the enemy unawares. The American and South Korean forces, fighting against being taken or being surrounded, offered no resistance and began to hastily retreat along the entire front.

During the night the forces of the CPV and KPA took all of the enemy defensive positions on the 38^th Parallel and moved up to 10-12 kilometers. As a result of the night battles they surrounded and captured several subunits of the 24^th US Infantry Division in the Sinipni area, and in the area of Mount Unak-san the forces of the 42^nd CPV Army crushed four battalions of the 2^nd ROK Infantry Division.

Starting on the morning of 1 January 1951, and under the cover of a rear guard reinforced by tanks, and with broad use made of aerial bombardment by bombers and fighter aviation to halt the Chinese Volunteer and Peoples Army forces, the Americans and the South Koreans continued to withdraw. The I and IX US Corps left in the direction of Seoul and Kwangju, and the main body of the III and II ROK Corps headed for Honchen. The divisions of the I ROK Corps retreated along the east coast towards Kannin.

With the goal of stopping the advance of the CPV and KPA forces, the enemy began to move the forces of the X US Corps towards the front. The 3^rd US Infantry Division from this corps moved to Pyongtaek, and the 7^th US Infantry Division to Chechong. The 1^st Marine Division continued to remain in the Phohan area.

Panic and the hasty retreat by all of the civil and military establishments was an obstacle for the UN forces caught in the pre-frontal belt. The government establishments located in Seoul and the military headquarters began a hasty evacuation to the south on 1 January.

The Unified Command, studying the situation at the front and the hasty retreat of the enemy to the south, gave new, deeper missions to its forces in the offensive.

The main strike force grouping of the Chinese Volunteers (the 50^th, 39^th, 40^th and 38^th CPV Armies) was ordered to use all of its forces to develop the offensive on the Seoul direction and take Seoul . Ultimately these forces were to take the line Suwon – Yanphen. The forces of the 42^nd and 66^th CPV Armies were given the task of moving to the line Yanphen – Honchen after they took Kanphyon and Chungchen.

The 1^st KPA Army received the mission to develop the offensive in the direction of Munsan – Kimpo, force the Han River, and take the line Inchon – Seoul in order to not permit the enemy to make a naval landing in that area.

The 2^nd and 5^th KPA Armies, which had used part of their forces since 25 December to operate inside the enemy’s deployments, were given the mission to move in the direction of Chechong.

Wiping out the enemy rear guard, by the end of the day on 1 January the CPV and KPA had moved to a depth of 15-25 kilometers and had moved to the line Kimchong – Sinipni – Kaphyon – Chungchen – Phunamni – Mount Hoday-san. On 2 and 3 January, and not halting combat operations neither day or night, they inflicted serious losses on the enemy and continued to successfully develop the offensive in a southerly direction.

The American command, in striving to halt the offensive by the Chinese Volunteers in the Seoul direction so that they could stop the evacuation of Seoul , prepared to launch a counterattack on 3 January with the forces of the 27^th and 29^th British Infantry Brigades and part of the forces of the 6^th ROK Infantry Division, reinforced by 100 tanks. The counterattack was repulsed, and the Chinese Volunteers, overcoming stiff resistance by the enemy, continued to move towards Seoul .

The 42^nd and 66^th CPV Armies, moving in difficult conditions with no roads, snow drifts, and with minus 25 degrees Celsius temperatures, continued to slowly move forward. On 3 January these forces had reached the line Sanyuli – Siransong.

The operations by the 2^nd and 5^th KPA Armies were particularly successful, and by the end of the day on 3 January they had moved some 60 kilometers into the depths of the enemy defenses, moving into the area south and southwest of Honchen and cutting off the way south for the 5^th, 7^th, 8^th and 3^rd ROK Infantry Divisions.

In order to clear the withdrawal routes for these divisions, on 4 January the UN command sent in the 2^nd US Infantry Division from the Chechong area along with the 7^th US Infantry Division from the Wonju area against the 2^nd and 5^th KPA Armies, and with heavy aviation support they launched an offensive in the directions of Haensen and Honchen. Simultaneously the 5^th, 7^th , 8^th and 3^rd ROK Infantry Divisions were given the task to strike out of the Honchen area to the south and break through the combat order of the 2^nd and 5^th KPA Armies and move to the Haensen area.

During the day on 4 January the blows from the south and north succeeded in driving off the forces of the 2^nd and 5^th KPA Armies to the east and providing a way for the South Korean forces to withdraw. After this offensive, which cost them unexpectedly significant losses, the South Korean and American forces on the Honchen direction made a hasty withdrawal to the south. Only poorly organized cooperation between the 42^nd and 66^th CPV Armies and the 2^nd and 5^th KPA Armies permitted the enemy to avoid encirclement and destruction.

On the Seoul direction, the American and South Korean forces, yielding to the units of the Chinese Volunteers, left Seoul on 4 January and after crossing the Han River continued to withdraw to the south.

By the end of the day on 4 January the main body of the CPV and KPA forces had reached the following line: the 1^st KPA Army was northeast of the Han River and 12-25 kilometers northwest of Seoul; the 50^th CPV Army was 5-7 kilometers north of Seoul; the 39^th CPV Army had reached Changdonni and one division had reached Seoul; the 40^th and 38^th CPV Armies had reached the line Yidenpu – Puphyonni; the 42^nd and 66^th CPV Armies were 4-6 kilometers south of the line Sanyuli – Siranson; the 2^nd and 5^th KPA Armies were fighting a tough battle with the enemy along the line Honchen - Haensen – Yudonli – Anhindong.

During the period 5-7 January the enemy succeeded in using trucks to move his forces, break away from pursuing units and take up the defense along the line Pyongtaek – Hannim – Hinholi – Chechong – Newol’– Chongchon – Songaeli – Pal’anni.

The Unified Command of the CPV and KPA, studying the desperate needs of their forces for provisions and ammunition, decided to terminate a further advance and give their forces a break to rest and replenish in these areas: the 1^st KPA Army – Kimpo – Inchon, and southwest of the outskirts of Seoul; the 38^th, 39^th and 40^th CPV Armies – Yidenpu, Seoul, and Masokuli; the 50^th CPV Army, which had been pursuing the enemy along the Seoul direction, would remain in the Suwon area; the 42^nd and 66^th CPV Armies were concentrated in the area southwest of Honchen; the forces of the 2^nd and 5^th KPA Armies, east and southeast of Haensen. The armies were to remain in contact with the enemy by the use of forward detachments, and these arrived in place on 8 January in the areas of Usan, Inchon, Wonju, north of Newol’ and Chongchon.

For that reason, the offensive operation by the CPV and KPA south of the 38^th Parallel carried out in the harsh conditions of the winter of 1951, ended with a major new victory. During the course of this operation the American and South Korean forces suffered serious losses and were driven back 90-110 kilometers from the 38^th Parallel. The destruction inflicted on the enemy south of the 38^th Parallel strongly influenced the confrontation between the countries participating in the war in Korea . The morale and military prestige of the American command wavered. The political and military authority of the CPV and KPA in the international arena significantly increased.

During the combat operations south of the 38^th Parallel the heaviest losses were inflicted on the 2^nd, 3^rd, 5^th, 6^th, and 8^th ROK Infantry Divisions and the 24^th US Infantry Division, as well as the 27^th and 29^th British Infantry Brigades. Overall enemy losses were more than 5,000 men killed and around 6,000 taken prisoner. Between 1 and 4 January the CPV and KPA forces captured 370 guns, more than 400 heavy machine guns, 25 tanks and more than 200 trucks and many other trophies.

An extreme limitation on the course of the operation was played by the shortages in the support of antitank and antiaircraft defenses to the forces of the CPV and KPA as well as the insignificant amount of transportation to move material goods. The forces were forced to carry out combat operations primarily at night, when the enemy could not effectively use his combat technology and especially his numerous aviation support.

The fall and winter offensive of the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army in 1950-1951 decisively changed the strategic and military-political situation in Korea in their favor. But at the same time, the UN forces were not ultimately destroyed and retained a significant quantitative and qualitative superiority in combat technology. By studying that, as well as in regard to the strained lines of communications complicated the support for the CPV and KPA forces with provisions and ammunition, and as their personnel needed rest and medical support, the Unified Command ordered the forces located south of the 38^th Parallel to go over to the defense. In this they considered the creation of a stout defense on the Seoul and Chungchen directions.

Five armies (the 1^st KPA and 38^th, 39^th, 40^th and 50^th CPV) were allocated for the defense of Seoul . This force grouping had the mission to prevent a naval landing by the enemy in the port of Inchon , to hold Seoul , and not permit the enemy’s main body to break through to the 38^th Parallel.

The Chungchen direction had to be held by the 42^nd CPV and 5^th KPA Armies, whose mission was to not permit the enemy to break through into the Honchen and Chungchen areas. The 2^nd KPA Army received the mission to defend the line from Pyongchan to Pal’hanni. The 66^th CPV Army was sent back north of the 38^th Parallel to the area of Kumhwa. The 3^rd KPA Army was deployed in the area of Chhyangdori.

After regrouping, the main body of the 13^th CPV Group Army was concentrated as follows: the 50^th CPV Army – north of Suwon; the 39^th CPV Army – northwest of Seoul; the 40^th CPV Army – Yidenpu and north; the 38^th CPV Army – east of Seoul in the area of Doksoli; the 42^nd CPV Army – in the area of Kaphyon; the 66^th CPV Army – north of the 38^th Parallel in the areas of Kumhwa and Hwachen.

The main body of the KPA continued to remain in their previous areas: the 1^st KPA Army – west of Seoul ; the 5^th KPA Army – in the Haensen area; and the 2^nd KPA Army – in the Pyongchan area.

Overall, the forces of the CPV and KPA designated for operations south of the 38^th Parallel numbered 31 infantry and one mechanized divisions and three infantry brigades. The average strength of a KPA infantry division at this time was about 7-8,000 men and those of the Chinese Volunteers were around 8-10,000 men. The CPV and KPA forces numbered some 1,850 guns and mortars larger than 76mm and 60 tanks.

The defense of the coasts remained as before: on the west, the 4^th KPA Army; in the east, the 9^th CPV Group Army, as well as the immediate subordination to the command of the Peoples Army of the independent 24^th and 41^st Infantry Divisions, the 63^rd Infantry Brigade, and the marine brigade. Overall the coastal defenses numbered 16 infantry divisions, one tank division and four brigades.

Beside these forces, the Unified Command had a reasonably large reserve at its disposal. Deep in the rear were the completely formed 6^th, 7^th and 8^th KPA Armies, numbering nine infantry divisions, which had moved to the Pyongyang area, and the 19^th CPV Group Army consisting of three armies (the 63^rd, 64^th and 65^th) with another nine divisions. Overall the Unified Command deployed 67 divisions and seven brigades.

The American command and their political leadership, after the disaster in Korea , made a number of attempts to restore their shaken prestige. On 13 January 1951 the governing circles in the USA turned to 30 other nations with a memorandum that asked for their support in applying economic and political sanctions in regard to the Peoples Republic of China . Subsequently they sought approval from the Security Council of the United Nations of a resolution that branded the DPRK the aggressor, guilty of carrying out “armed intervention against the Republic of Korea .” They felt that these would cause China to remove its volunteers from Korea .

The basis of the strategic plan of the American command remained as before, namely the idea of decisive operations with the goal of destroying the CPV and KPA forces and occupying the territory of the DPRK with armed forces. Starting on 15 January 1951 the American command moved to prepare for an offensive operation. Per that plan the 8^th US Army had to launch an offensive in three directions from the line Pyongtaek – Hinholi – Newol’ – Pal’hanni: towards Seoul ; towards Honchen; and from the Newol’ area to Hachinpuli. It was planned to use another naval landing at Inchon in order to retake Seoul .

In accordance with the plan, the forces were given the following established missions.

The I US Corps had to advance in the direction of Suwon , Seoul and had the task of destroying the units of the 1^st KPA Army and the 50^th CPV Army there, and then take Seoul .

The IX and X US Corps, advancing in the direction of Hensen – Honchen, had the mission of destroying the 5^th KPA Army in the Hensen area and taking Kaphyon and Chungchen.

The III ROK Corps had to operate, in cooperation with the 7^th US Infantry Division of X US Corps, to destroy the 2^nd KPA Army in the Pyongchan area and then advance on Hachinpuli.

With the goal of obtaining reconnaissance data on the force grouping of CPV and KPA forces, the American command organized combat operations by forward detachments and reconnaissance detachments during the second half of January across the entire front. These were particularly active along the Usan – Wonju line; these battles did not cease day or night. In isolated cases the American subunits succeeded in penetrating the defenses of the Chinese Volunteers and the Peoples Army, but they would then proceed until they ran into organized opposition and then hastily retreat to their starting positions.

By 25 January 1951, after regrouping the American and South Korean forces were in the following positions.

The I US Corps occupied a 30 kilometer sector of the front from Pyongtaek to Anson, with the 25^th and 3^rd US Infantry Divisions on the front line with the 1^st ROK Infantry Division. The corps had the 29^th British Infantry Brigade and the independent Turkish Infantry Brigade in reserve in the Chyongan area.

Along a 55 kilometer stretch of front from Anson to east of Hinholi was the IX US Corps. All of the formations of this corps (the 6^th ROK Infantry Division, the 1^st US Cavalry Division, the 24^th US Infantry Division and the 27^th British Infantry Brigade) were in a single echelon.

Along the 55 kilometer line from Hinholi to Newol’ was the X US Corps with the 2^nd and 7^th US Infantry Divisions. The 2^nd, 5^th and 8^th ROK Infantry Divisions of this corps were in reserve in the areas of Chungju, Hamchan and Yonju.

The sector from Newol’ to Pal’hanni of some 75 kilometers was covered as before by the formations of the III and I ROK Corps. The III ROK Corps had the 3^rd ROK Infantry Division in reserve in the area of Chungyan.

For its reserve, the 8^th US Army had the 1^st Marine Division in the Andon area, the 11^th ROK Infantry Division in the Kimsan area, and the 187^th RCT in the area southwest of Yonju.

Overall the UN forces had 17 divisions, three brigades and one airborne regiment, which mean an average density of one division per 12.5 kilometers of front along the 230 kilometer line. The enemy had up to 2,000 field guns and mortars of 75mm caliber and up, as well up to 800 tanks and 1,600 aircraft.

The command of the 8^th US Army, in preparing for the offensive operation, drew on the experience of previous battles and especially the tactics used by the CPV and KPA, and had a number of directives for each direction. In accordance with these directives, the divisions were to advance with a reinforced forward detachment leading. The main role in the offensive would be given to the artillery, tanks and aviation, and the infantry would hold all that was achieved by their successes.

For that reason the operations of the 8^th US Army hoped to avoid getting caught by surprise attacks by the CPV and KPA forces during the course of the offensive and retain their freedom of movement.

From the table it can be seen that the number of divisions and troops were in the favor of the Unified Command. But at the same time they were inferior to the enemy in the amount of artillery, tanks and aircraft.

Defensive Operations of the Chinese Volunteers and the Korean Peoples Army from 26 January to 10 February. On 26 January 1951 the forces of the 8^th US Army went over to the offensive. After a preparatory artillery and aviation bombardment the forward detachments of I and IX US Corps attacked the forward units of the 50^th, 38^th and 42^nd CPV Armies and the 5^th KPA Army along the line Usan – Inchon – Wonju. A fierce battle took place along this line for the course of the day.

On 27 January the UN put a naval landing ashore in the Inchon area – up to 300 South Korean troops. But at the same time, in spite of its support by naval gunfire and naval aviation this landing had no success. After a four-hour battle it was completely wiped out by the forces of the 1^st KPA Army.

On that day the forward units of the 2^nd US Infantry Division took Wonju. On 28 January the enemy brought up his unengaged units and succeeded in driving the forward detachments of Chinese Volunteers from the line Usan – Inchon and by the end of the day on 29 January had moved 10-15 kilometers along the Seoul direction. Further offensive operations on this direction by UN forces would be against the main body of the 50^th, 38^th, and 42^nd CPV Armies and the 1^st KPA Army.

Along the east coast the Capital Infantry Division of the I ROK Corps succeeded in taking the line Songaeli – Pal’hanni by overcoming resistance by the insignificant forward detachments of the 2^nd KPA Army who were forced to retreat to the north. On 29 January the 69^th KPA Infantry Brigade from the 3^rd KPA Army was sent into combat on this direction. As a result of the combat operations of this brigade, the enemy was forced back and the positions reestablished.

Between 29 January and 4 February a fierce defensive battle was fought on the Seoul direction by the forces of the 13^th CPV Group Army against the advancing forces of the I and IX US Corps. The enemy used every effort to take Seoul . The Chinese Volunteers stiff defense and counterattacks not only stopped the march of the enemy, but inflicted heavy losses upon him.

Not achieving success on the Seoul direction, on 4 February the 8^th US Army command decided to commit the forces of the X US Corps and the III and I ROK Corps to an offensive along the central and eastern sectors of the front.

After a preparatory artillery and aviation bombardment, enemy forces went over to the offensive on the morning of 5 February, launching strikes on Seoul , Hensen and Kannin.

During the course of the two-day battle they achieved a number of successes. On the Seoul direction, the entry of the 29^th British and independent Turkish Brigades into combat succeeded in breaking through the defenses of the 50^th CPV Army north of Suwon and by the end of the day on 6 February isolated detachments had reached the Han River south of Seoul . With the rupture of this defense in the Suwon area, it created a threat to isolate the units of the 1^st KPA Army and the 50^th CPV Army in the Inchon area. The Unified Command decided to move these forces to the right bank of the Han River where they could take up the defense.

On 10 February the enemy forces renewed their attacks on Seoul from the south and southwest. On this direction the enemy had a large number of tanks participating on their side plus aviation. All attempts by the American and South Korean forces to force the Han River in the Seoul area on 11 February met without success. The forces of the 1^st KPA Army and the 50^th CPV Army firmly held the defenses on the north bank of the Han River .

In the center (the Honchen direction) the enemy put two mixed divisions into combat (the 5^th and 8^th ROK Infantry Divisions) and succeeded penetrating the defenses of the 5^th KPA Army north of Wonju. Under blows from superior enemy formations this army was forced to withdraw to the north. By the end of the day on 6 February the forward units of the IX and X US Corps were fighting for Hensen. The main body of these corps, advancing along the banks of the Han River, attempted to develop a strike against Seoul from the east. But at the same time 10-12 kilometers south and southeast of Yanphen they ran into stiff resistance from the formations of the 38^th and 42^nd CPV Armies, and were forced to break off further advances.

In the eastern sector of the front, the Americans and South Koreans succeeded in taking Kannin on 11 February.

By the end of the day on 11 February the CPV and KPA forces were fighting along the line Yondok – Seoul – Kwanju – Yanphen – north of Hensen and Kanphyonni – Inguli. For that reason, over the course of 17 days the American and South Korean forces had succeeded in moving forward 40-55 kilometers with an average movement speed of 3 kilometers per day.

Counterstrike of the forces of the 13^th CPV Group Army and the 3^rd and 5^th KPA Armies from 11 to 16 February. Having created conditions where the enemy was not able to penetrate the defenses at the junction of the 42^nd CPV Army and the 5^th KPA Army and develop their offensive towards Seoul, even back on 7 February the Unified Command decided to prepare for a counterstrike against the enemy force grouping operating in the area southeast of Yanphen, Wonju, Haanhinnni and Hensen.

To achieve this goal two strike force groupings were created northwest and northeast of Hensen: the first – consisting of three CPV armies (the 39^th, 40^th and 66^th) was in the area northeast of Yanphen, and the second – consisting of two KPA armies (the 3^rd and 5^th) was in the area northeast of Hensen. The first strike force grouping had to destroy units of the 2^nd US and 8^th ROK Infantry Divisions operating in the Yanphen area, and subsequently advance in the general direction of Chungju. The second strike force grouping had the mission of destroying units of the 3^rd and 5^th ROK Infantry Divisions in the area northeast of Wonju, and subsequently advancing in the general direction of Newol’. The counterstrike was to begin on 11 February.

To reinforce the defense in the western sector of the front the Unified Command decided to transfer the 26^th CPV Army from the 9^th CPV Group Army from the east coast to the Seoul direction. The army had to be in place by 15 February and concentrate in the Yenchen area and south.

In accordance with these decisions the forces began to reorganize and by 11 February were deployed in the following areas: the 39^th, 40^th and 66^th CPV Armies were east of Yanphen; the 3^rd KPA Army was northeast of Honchen. The 5^th KPA Army was continuing to fight along a line north of Hensen.

At 1700 on 11 February both strike force groupings went over to the offensive. The advancing forces ran into stiff enemy resistance. But at the same time, the American and South Korean forces on the central direction were forced to withdraw to the south under cover of a rear guard.

On 12 February the enemy made a naval landing on the west coast south of Sonchen. After combat with units of the 6^th KPA Army, this landing force was forced to withdraw from this area.

As a result of four days of combat, the main body of the 13^th CPV Group Army in cooperation with the 5^th and 3^rd KPA Armies had destroyed the 8^th and 3^rd ROK Infantry Divisions and inflicted heavy losses on the 5^th ROK Infantry Division. In this they had surrounded the 23^rd Infantry Regiment from the 2^nd US Infantry Division in an area southeast of Yanphen and were fighting for Wonju.

In conjunction with the retreat by the IX and X US Corps on the central sector of the front, the 8^th US Army command decided to operationally withdraw the forces of the III and I ROK Corps operating in the eastern sector to the south. The formations of the 2^nd KPA Army and 69^th KPA Infantry Brigade, detecting the withdrawal of enemy forces, began to pursue the 7^th, 9^th and Capital ROK Infantry Divisions.

During their retreat, and with the goal of stopping the advance of the 2^nd KPA Army, the American and South Korean forces made wide use of mines placed in the ground without any concealment. Enemy bomber and fighter aviation increased their operations against lines of communication and in areas where the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army had concentrated. Having no means to combat aviation, the main body of CPV and KPA forces was forced to primarily operate at night. Only forward detachments operated in daylight hours.

On 15 February, seeing the danger along the central front of permitting the CPV and KPA forces to continue their offensive, the UN forces command hastily transferred units of the 1^st US Cavalry Division and the 29^th British Infantry Brigade from the Seoul direction to the area of Wonju.

On 16 February, the forces of the 42^nd, 39^th, 40^th, and 66^th CPV Armies, as well as the 3^rd, 5^th and 2^nd KPA Armies on the central and eastern sectors of the front, had reached a line of Yanphen – Wonju – north of Newol’ – northwest of Chongchon – south of Kannin where, having run into stiff enemy resistance, they terminated their offensive and began to dig in.

On the Seoul direction, during the course of this offensive the forces of the 1^st KPA Army, the 50^th and 38^th CPV Armies continued to hold their previous lines.

Over the five days of the offensive under conditions of deep snowfall and low temperatures (20-25 degrees below zero Celsius) the CPV and KPA on the central and eastern sectors of the front had moved 20-30 kilometers deep while fighting, with an average speed of 4-6 kilometers per day.

For that reason, as a result of three weeks of defensive combat in January-February 1951 the forces of the CPV and KPA south of the 38^th Parallel had managed to not only halt the offensive of superior enemy forces but also to launch a counterstrike.

The losses to the enemy in killed, wounded and captured were more than 12,000 men. Particularly serious losses were suffered by the units of the IX and X US Corps.

But together with that the condition of the CPV and KPA troops at the front became extremely severe. In connection with their losses the manpower strength of their divisions was significantly reduced. The troops found themselves with a dangerous need for ammunition, provisions, equipment, and especially medical support and rest. All of this limited their ability to not only continue the offensive but to further maintain the lines they had achieved.

Withdrawal of the Chinese Volunteers and Korean Peoples Army to the 38^th Parallel from 20 February to 21 April 1951. The Unified Command, having studied the situation and status of their forces at the front, as well as the probability of the nature of operations by American and South Korean forces, decided to pull back the forces of the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd and 5^th KPA Armies and the 13^th CPV Group Army from the line Seoul – Yanphen – Wonju – Kannin to the 38^th Parallel. They had assessed that on this line the terrain was more suitable for deploying a large force grouping and concealing the preparations for a new offensive operation. The operation was oriented around a proposal to begin in the second half of April, after the units of the 3^rd, 9^th and 19^th CPV Group Armies had completed assembling in area north of the 38^th Parallel along with the forces of the 7^th and 8^th KPA Armies.

The forces of the 13^th CPV Group Army and the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd and 5^th KPA Armies at the front had to defend along a prepared line to stop the American and South Korean forces and then subsequently withdraw back to the 38^th Parallel.

The plan considered creating three defensive lines: the first – along the north bank of the Han River from Seoul to Yanphen, then to Hensen and north of Pyongchan; the second – along the line of Yidenpu – Honchen – Anhidong; and the third – Munsan – Sinipni – Chungchen. The distance between the lines was no more than 15-20 kilometers. It was planned to withdraw in three corresponding stages. The first stage would take 20 days and the 13^th CPV Army (the 42^nd, 40^th and 66^th CPV Corps)[12] and the 3^rd, 5^th and 2^nd KPA Armies had to move from the line Wonju – north of Newol’ to the line Yanphen – Hensen – north of Pyongchan.

The forces of the 50^th and 38^th CPV Corps and the 1^st KPA Army had to remain in their present positions on the north bank of the Han River . The 2^nd KPA Army, in conjunction with its heavy losses, would be sent back to the rear to replace them.

On the first defensive line it was proposed to have three KPA armies in the first echelon (the 1^st, 3^rd and 5^th) and four corps from the 13^th CPV Army (the 50^th, 38^th, 42^nd and 66^th); the reserve consisted of two corps (40^th and 39^th) from that army.

During the course of the second stage of the operation, which was to last around 30 days, the forces had to pull back along the entire front to the second defensive line. Just as with the first defensive line, it was planned to have four corps from the 13^th CPV Army (26^th, 38^th, 40^th and 39^th) and three KPA armies (1^st, 3^rd and 5^th) in the first echelon; the reserve would consist of two corps from the 13^th CPV Army (42^nd and 66^th). When the 50^th CPV Corps of the 13^th CPV Army moved into the Yidenpu area it had to be replaced by the 26^th CPV Corps of the 9^th CPV Army.[13] The 50^th CPV Corps would be sent back to the Pyongyang area to rest.

During the third stage, which was to last 20 days, the forces had to withdraw to the third defensive line. Eight divisions were allocated to defend this line. The main body of the 13^th CPV Army and the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd and 5^th KPA Armies were to withdraw to areas north of the 38^th Parallel and replace their losses.

In accordance with the overall plan the Unified Command gave out a number of specific orders to the troop on how the defense was to be conducted. In order to avoid losses from enemy air and artillery strikes, the forces had to conduct combat operations across a broad front. In the defense it was recommended to the units and formations to keep their main bodies deployed on the reverse slopes of hills and keep reconnaissance subunits and combat security in front of them. Due to the shortage of artillery it was decided to place all available artillery with the first echelon. The defense had to be an active defense. Counterattacks were to be conducted by small groups, swiftly and using surprise, and against enemy units while in movement. In case of enemy superiority of forces it was recommended to avoid serious combat and to let the enemy strike only deserted areas.

Organization of rear services and material-technical support to the forces composed one of most serious problems and therefore the Unified Command took all measures in allocating work to the rear services. In this special attention was paid to establishing highway and railway networks where they could accumulate ammunition and provisions as well as organize medical support and create conditions for troops to rest.

In accordance with the plan the forces of the 42^nd, 40^th and 66^th CPV Corps and the 3^rd, 5^th and 2^nd KPA Armies began to withdraw to the first defensive line on the night of 20 February. The withdrawal of the main body was covered by a rear guard.

When they established that the CPV and KPA forces were withdrawing, the command of the 8^th US Army began to follow them with forward detachments from the IX and X US Corps and I and III ROK Corps. Starting on the morning of 22 February the main bodies of these corps began to move along behind the forward detachments.

Simultaneously the American command increased the operations by their fleet in the areas of the ports of Nampo, Hinnam, and Wonsan . These ports were proposed as areas where they could be systematically swept by naval gunfire.

At 0400 hours on 23 February the enemy landed in the area of Sukkol’, southwest of Nampo, with a naval landing of 1,500 men who were soon destroyed by units of the 36^th KPA Infantry Division of the 6^th KPA Army.

On 25 February the enemy took Sin-Som Island north of Wonsan . The naval landing on the island was covered by up to 27 US Navy vessels.

By 4 March the main body of the Chinese Volunteers and the Peoples Army had been completely withdrawn to the first defensive line.

By the end of the day on 6 March the forward detachments had reached the line southeast of Yanphen – Hensen – north of Phyonchan – Chumunjin, and right behind them were the main bodies of the IX and X US Corps and I and III ROK Corps. All attempts by the enemy in the Seoul and Yanphen sectors to force the Han River and set up a bridgehead on its northern bank were successfully repulsed during this period by the forces of the 1^st KPA Army and the 50^th and 38^th CPV Corps. During the course of combat operations American aviation launched strikes on the forces in the areas of Seoul, south of Chungchen, Honchen and Hensen, as well as bombed Pyongyang and the lines of communications on the east and west coasts of the DPRK.

The command of the 8^th US Army, in order to destroy the CPV and KPA forces, decided to continue the offensive. To achieve these goals they proposed making two simultaneous strikes. The first strike would be carried out by the forces of the I US Corps on the approaches to Seoul from the west and east in the direction of Yidenpu – Chongdok. The second (main) strike would be carried out by the forces of the IX and X US Corps in the direction of Honchen, Chungchen, Hwachen. The forces of the I and III ROK Corps were given the mission of following the KPA forces in their zones and develop the offensive in a northerly direction.

On 7 March, after a preparatory air and artillery bombardment the American and South Korean forces began the offensive. In the area east of Seoul units of the 25^th US Infantry Division, using amphibious trucks, forced the Han River from the march and captured a bridgehead on the north bank.

In the central sector of the front the IX and X US Corps, using tank and artillery support, renewed the offensive against the units on the left flank of the 13^th CPV Army and the 5^th KPA Army. In spite of the fact that the enemy had a superiority in combat technology all of his attempts to develop his strike in the Honchen area met without success. During the course of three days (7-9 March) a terrible battle raged in this sector of the front with varying success. In the eastern sector of the front the 3^rd and 2^nd KPA Armies continued to hold their previous lines.

On the night of 10 March, in accordance with orders from the Unified Command, the 13^th CPV Army and the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, and 5^th KPA Armies began their planned withdrawal to the second defensive line. On 14 March they left Seoul , which was taken on 15 March by units of the 1^st ROK Infantry Division.

The withdrawal of the forces was carried out under conditions of the beginning of the spring rasputitsa (thaw). Movement over all roads was limited, and therefore combat operations were carried out primarily along the roads. The congestion when the forces were withdrawing to the rear on the roads and near them complicated the commands in carrying out commensurate maneuver, command and control of forces, as well as concealment of the forces from enemy aviation.

During this period American aviation continued to launch strikes both along the front as well as against objects north of the 38^th Parallel. Particularly vicious strikes were made against Pyongyang and the port of Wonsan . The latter, beside that, was under daily fire from enemy warships at sea. On these days enemy aviation was making up to 1,000 sorties and more per day.

By 16 March the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army had reached the second line, where they went on the defense. The first echelon consisted of the 19^th KPA Infantry Division of the 6^th KPA Army, the 38^th, 40^th, 42^nd, and 39^th CPV Corps of the 13^th CPV Army, and the 2^nd KPA Army. The reserve included the 66^th CPV Corps and the 3^rd KPA Army. The 1^st and 5^th KPA Armies and the 50^th CPV Corps of the 13^th CPV Army were withdrawn to the rear to rest and carry out replacement.

The arrival of units of the 19^th CPV Army from the PRC on 16 March saw them concentrate in the following areas: the 64^th CPV Corps in Namchyon, the 63^rd CPV Corps in Sibili and southeast, and the 65^th CPV Corps moving out of Pyongyang . The newly formed 3^rd CPV Army with three corps (the 12^th, 15^th and 60^th) began to move into the territory of the DPRK on 15 March.

Together with the continuing enemy offensive on the front and the threat of moving the main body of his forces north of the 38^th Parallel the Unified Command began to prepare a new line of defense along the line Jioaen – Kimchong – Hwachen – Yayan. Simultaneously this line was planned for use as the starting line for the counteroffensive by the CPV and KPA.

On 17 March combat continued on all fronts. Just as during the preceding days, the American and South Korean advanced with the support of artillery, tanks, and aviation. Concentrating on a narrow sector southwest of Honchen units of the 1^st US Cavalry Division, the 27^th British Infantry Brigade, and the 1^st Marine Division penetrated the defenses of the 42^nd and 39^th CPV Corps west of Honchen and seized several bridgeheads across the Honchong River . In spite of the numerous counterattacks by units of the 42^nd and 39^th CPV Corps, the enemy succeeded in moving forward 1-3 kilometers. Further movement by the Singman Rhee forces to the north in this sector would create a threat of encirclement of the units of the 39^th CPV Corps east of Honchen and movement to the third defensive line in the area of Chungchen. So that they could not develop the offensive towards Chungchen and move into the rear area of the 40^th, 42^nd and 39^th CPV Corps, the Unified Command decided to move their forces back to the third defensive line.

By the end of the day on 22 March the American forces had succeeded on the central sector of the front in driving back the units of the Chinese Volunteers and taking the large populated area and important road junction of Chungchen. Further advances by UN forces to the north of Chungchen were halted by the formations of the 39^th CPV Corps, who was occupying its positions on the third defensive line. In order to not permit the enemy to move into the areas north of the 38^th Parallel, the Unified Command brought up two divisions from the 8^th KPA Army to the Hwachen area.[14]

On 17 March, in the western sector of the front north of Seoul all attempts by the American and South Korean forces to develop the strike north from Seoul were successfully rebuffed by units of the 19^th KPA Infantry Division of the 1^st KPA Army and the 26^th CPV Corps.

On 22 March the enemy again made a naval landing in the area of Sukkol’, which was destroyed by the units of the 36^th KPA Infantry Division of the 6^th KPA Army.

Meeting stiff opposition from the Chinese Volunteers and the Peoples Army, on 23-24 March the American command made an airborne assault in the rear of the 19^th KPA Infantry Division of the 6^th KPA Army and the 26^th CPV Corps northeast of Munsan, with the 187^th RCT. On that day the 3^rd US Infantry Division took Yidenpu. Together with the withdrawal of the 19^th KPA Infantry Division to the Munsan area and on the right bank of the Imjin River between the forces of the making the breakthrough, the consequences of which caused the 26^th CPV Corps to be forced to begin to withdraw to the third defensive line.

On the eastern sector of the front the forces of the 2^nd, 3^rd and 5^th KPA Armies, fighting a rear guard action with the enemy, during the period 17-26 March continued to slowly withdraw to the 38^th Parallel.

By the end of the day on 26 March combat operation were being conducted southeast of Munsan, north of Yidenpu, Kaphyon and Chungchen, Chaimni, and Inguli.

Having not achieved any success in the previous days, the American command increased the operations by its forces on the western and eastern sectors of the front. During the course of combat operations covering the period of 27 March to 4 April the American and South Korean forces succeeded in breaking through the defenses of the 26^th CPV Corps north of Donduchen and began to move towards the 38^th Parallel.

With the goal of not permitting the enemy to move to the north, the CPV command brought up the 63^rd CPV Corps from the 19^th CPV Army.

In the eastern sector of the front the Capital Infantry Division succeeded in pushing back units of the 2^nd KPA Army and on 29 March took a major population center – the city of Yayan . By 4 April the front line ran along the right bank of the Imjin River – Chongdok – north of Chungchen – Kyomni – Yayan. The 1^st and 5^th KPA Armies were sent into reserve in the area north of the 38^th Parallel. By this time two corps of the 3^rd CPV Army that had previous been given a timeline had finished concentrating in the area of Koksan and southeast.

The command of the 8^th US Army, in attempting to take the important highway and railway junctions of Chorwon, Pyongkan, and Kumhwa, decided to continue the offensive north of the 38^th Parallel.

On 6 April, after a preparatory air and artillery bombardment, American and South Korean forces renewed the offensive. But at the same time, they ran into stiff opposition along the entire length of the front from the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army. The battle took on an extremely violent nature. All attempts by the enemy to break through to north of the 38^th Parallel were repulsed by the fire and counterattacks of the CPV and KPA.

At 2130 on 7 April, under the cover of aviation and US Naval gunfire , the enemy made naval landings on the east coast of

Korea

in the areas of Chengjin, Kengsen, and Aetaetin. But at the same time these naval landings enjoyed little success and were quickly destroyed by units of the Peoples Army.

Starting on 7 April American aviation began to make massive raids on the crossings over the Yalu River in the area of Antung . As a result of these raids they succeeded in inflicting significant damage to the primary crossings. The raids against the crossings saw the use of B-29 bombers. They carried out bombing from altitudes of 5-6,000 meters.

During the course of the hard battles fought from 7 to 11 April the American and South Korean forces succeeded on the central front in pushing back the units of the 26^th, 40^th and 39^th CPV Corps and penetrating 1-3 kilometers north of the 38^th Parallel.

In accordance with the decisions of the Unified Command, on 15 April the forces of the CPV and KPA began to withdraw to the primary defensive line north of the 38^th Parallel. By the end of the day on 21 April they had taken up the defense along the line north of Kaysen – northwest of Chongdok – Munhonli – Hwachen – Yangu – Chyondinni.

For that reason, from 20 February to 21 April the Chinese Volunteers and the Peoples Army, in accordance with the concept of the Unified Command, had withdrawn 75-100 kilometers to the north. During this time the enemy had lost more than 30,000 men killed, wounded or captured.

On 11 April President of the US Truman relieved General MacArthur from his position as commander in chief of the armed forces in the Far East, and named General Ridgway to take his place; up to that point Ridgway had been the commander of the 8^th US Army in Korea . General Van Fleet was named to take over command of the 8^th US Army.

In relieving the supreme commander, the president was using his legal prerogative. General Douglas MacArthur was not a supporter of limiting the zone for conducting the war to just the Korean Peninsula and did not consider it necessary to hide his disagreement with the concept that he had to confine his combat operations to the limited geographic space. Previously, in one of his letters to Joseph W. Martin Jr., a member of the House of Representatives from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts , who openly agreed with him, MacArthur wrote that “in this war there is no alternative but victory.” MacArthur did not advise the use of nuclear weapons or carrying out a ground invasion of China . He only wanted to destroy – with the use of conventional bombers from the air – the bases in Manchuria which were being used as a springboard for the invasion of Korea . More than once he had asked to use the Chinese Nationalist Army during the course of combat operations in the Korean war, as well as advised that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek should have the possibility of returning from Taiwan ( Formosa ) to continental

China

. He was sure that the Soviet Union would not risk going to war to provide aid to China, but if the USSR did make such a mistake, then the United States would not have a more advantageous moment that would correspond to its plans in regard to the Kremlin. Without consulting with Washington , he invited the Chinese commander in Korea to capitulate (25 March) and gave him the understanding that in case the war continued there was the possibility that he would then have to carry out bombardment of Communist China by naval gunfire and aerial attack.

President Truman was in absolute disagreement with these views. General MacArthur did not recognize such understanding of the authority of the president and the judgment of national policies. Recognizing the danger to the free world of an attempt to take the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons, the United States found itself in a position that it would have to give up on to the idea of liberating all of Korea but at least could find a way to reestablish the status quo in its southern part. Unceremoniously, MacArthur found out that he had been removed by listening to a radio program which shocked many. On his return to the United States , MacArthur was greeted as a hero and was invited to speak at a joint session of Congress, which he was not slow to accept. Later, as a result of a Senate investigation (May-June 1951) it was the basis for political material; and if there was a general outcome, it follows to say that the subsequent policies of the United States would be even stricter.

From 25 January to 21 April 1951 the Chinese Volunteer forces carried out a corresponding defensive operation and prepared withdrawal to the 38^th Parallel. During the course of combat operations they avoided the enemy forces, played for the necessary time to concentrate their reserves and created advantageous conditions for the subsequent active operations of their main forces.

The Unified Command artfully organized and controlled the combat operations of its forces. The defense by its forces was brightly reflected by the maneuvering nature with the use of active counter-operations – counterattacks and counterstrikes. The deep dispositions of the forces and the broad use of maneuver during the withdrawal permitted the forces to hold vital objects and lines with a minimal expenditure of effort, forcing the enemy to concentrate his strike force groupings and expend his reserves.

The nature of enemy operations in this period was such that the offensive, as is correct, began after an air and artillery preparation. The forces advanced in extreme danger, threatened by surprise strikes by the Chinese Volunteers and the Peoples Army. More attention had to be paid to reconnaissance and security.

The combat operations by the Chinese Volunteers and the Peoples Army from 22 April to 9 July 1951 had great strategic significance. This was the period of stressful armed conflict by the CPV and KPA forces to secure the final victory and maintain the initiative.

Counteroffensive by the Chinese Volunteers and Korean Peoples Army from 22 to 29 April 1951. The Unified Command even in February 1951 made the decision to concentrate its forces and prepare for a counteroffensive. The final development of the plan was completed on 17 April.

The plan of the counteroffensive proposed the destruction of the main forces of the I and IX US Corps in the inter-river area between the Imjin and the Bukhan. Subsequently the forces were to develop the offensive on the entire front in the direction of Seoul , Phyonchan, and Kannin.

In correspondence with the plan the Unified Command gave its forces the following missions.

The 1^st KPA Army and the 19^th CPV Army, in cooperation with the 15^th CPV Corps of the 3^rd CPV Army, had to destroy the 1^st ROK Infantry Division and the 29^th British Infantry Brigade on the line Kaysen – north of Chongdok, subsequently, they were to develop the offensive with their main body towards Seoul and with part of their forces towards Mansaekyoli, and not permit the enemy forces to withdraw to the crossings over the Han River in the Seoul area.

The 3^rd CPV Army had the mission of destroying the 3^rd US Infantry Division and the Turkish Infantry Brigade and, advancing in the direction of Mansaekyoli, in cooperation with the units of the 19^th CPV Army they were not to permit the enemy forces to withdraw to Seoul .

The 9^th CPV Army (20^th, 26^th, 27^th, 39^th and 40^th CPV Corps) received the mission of destroying the units of the 25^th and 24^th US Infantry Divisions, the 6^th ROK Infantry Division and the 27^th British Infantry Brigade along the line south of Chorwon – Hwachen and subsequently develop the offensive towards Kaphyon and Chungchen.

The 19^th and 3^rd CPV Armies were allocated six howitzer artillery regiments and one antitank artillery regiment; beside that, the 3^rd CPV Army received one tank regiment. The 9^th CPV Army received nine howitzer artillery regiments and one antitank artillery regiment.

For that reason, in order to destroy the primary enemy force grouping on the 120 kilometer front from Kaysen to Hwachen, out of 48 divisions 39 were concentrated and provided with reinforcing means, giving a density of one division per 3 kilometers of front.

The 3^rd and 5^th KPA Armies had to advance in their zones with a goal of limiting the ability of the 8^th US Army to transfer forces from the eastern to the central sector of the front.

The 2^nd KPA Army had to remain in the area of Changdori as the reserve of the command. The 8^th KPA Army was disbanded. The personnel in the divisions under its command were transferred to restore the manning levels of the 2^nd and 3^rd KPA Armies. Beside the 2^nd KPA Army, the frontal reserve included three artillery regiments, two mortar regiments (rocket launcher units), and one antitank artillery regiment. The operational structure of the front consisted of a first echelon and a reserve.

The operational structure of the 19^th and 3^rd CPV Armies was in two echelons. The first echelons of these armies consisted of two army corps and the second echelon of one corps. The structure of the 9^th CPV Army was a single echelon. The combat orders of the CPV corps were, as is correct, formed in two echelons. The first echelon consisted of two divisions, and the second echelon of one division. The operational structure of the Korean armies consisted of divisions organized into two echelons.

By 21 April the American and South Korean forces along the 185 kilometer front had 14 divisions and brigades in their first echelon. On average one infantry division covered 13 kilometers of front. In their reserve the corps held four infantry divisions, one infantry brigade and one airborne regiment; the army reserve consisted of two infantry divisions, which were deployed in the central area of South Korea .

The command of the 8^th US Army, deployed, perhaps, based on intelligence data on the movement of mixed forces of the Peoples Volunteers from China into Korea and awaiting CPV and KPA forces going over on the offensive, had by early April prepared two defensive lines in the rear of their forces. The first rear line of defense was 20-30 kilometers south of the 38^th Parallel along the line Yidenpu – Chungchen; the second defensive line was 40-50 kilometers south of the first one and ran along the line north of Suwon – Wonju.

To strengthen their forces on the eastern sector of the front the Americans transferred the 11^th ROK Infantry Division from the central part of South Korea by sea.

Along with the regular arrival of replacements in Korea from the satellite countries of the USA , the American command finished preparing two American infantry divisions and one British infantry brigade in Japan . These formations were to be transferred to Korea in the near future.

As can be see from Table 12, the forces of the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army were superior to the enemy in infantry, insignificantly better in artillery, and as before inferior in tanks and aviation. The CPV and KPA aviation primarily covered objects in the rear area.

As can be seen in Table 13, the forces of the CPV and KPA were superior to the enemy forces in strength on the central and western sectors of the front with the exception of tanks.

In the eastern sector of the front the force ratio was in the favor of the UN forces, particularly in regard to artillery and tanks. The American and South Korean forces on this direction had a nearly three to one superiority to the CPV and KPA forces in artillery and absolute superiority in tanks.

After an artillery preparation on the night of 22 April, the CPV and KPA forces went over to the offensive along the entire front. The Americans and South Koreans, taking up prepared positions, initially put up a stiff resistance. But at the same time the Chinese and Korean infantry, under the cover of darkness, and using the slope of the terrain, broke through the defenses and got into the enemy’s rear area. Threatened by strikes from the rear, the American and South Korean forces on the western and central sectors of the front were forced to begin a withdrawal.

On 23 April the formations of the 1^st KPA Army took the major populated area of Kaysen and began to pursue units of the 1^st ROK Infantry Division in the direction of Munsan. On this date the forces of the 64^th and 63^rd CPV Corps of the 19^th CPV Army, inflicting damage on the 29^th British Infantry Brigade, used forward detachments to force a crossing of the Imjin River and took a number of bridgeheads on its left bank. During the day enemy forces, with aviation and artillery support, made multiple attempts to launch a counterattack with infantry and tanks to destroy the forward detachments of the 19^th CPV Army, but at the same time had no success. The Chinese Volunteers not only rebuffed all of the attacks, but broadened the bridgeheads that they held in both front and depth.

The formations of the 3^rd CPV Army, having defeated the 3^rd US Infantry Division in the area northwest of Yonchon, took that city on 23 April. The 9^th CPV Army, inflicting destruction on the 6^th ROK Infantry Division in the area west of Hwachen, took sector of the road north of Simpori.

The enemy put up particularly stiff opposition to the forces of the 26^th, 27^th and 20^th CPV Corps of the 9^th CPV Army. All of their attacks with the goal of breaking through the positions occupied by the enemy were rebuffed by units of the 24^th and 25^th US Infantry Divisions. Only when the threats of the formations of the 3^rd CPV Army and 40^th CPV Corps of the 9^th CPV Army to penetrate into the rear of the of 24^th and 25^th US Infantry Divisions did they begin to withdraw to the south on 24 April. Starting on 24 April the American and South Korean forces were forced to withdraw to the south on the western and central sections of the front due to the blows struck by the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army.

In pursuing the UN forces, the 1^st KPA Army forced the Imjin River northwest of Munsan and on 25 April took the city of Munsan , and the formations of the 19^th, 3^rd and 9^th CPV Armies took Chongdok and moved to the line southwest of Munsan – south of Chongdok – Mansaekyoli – north of Kaphyon – Yuchonni. During the course of this three day battle they moved forward 20-30 kilometers at a speed of 6-10 kilometers per day.

On the eastern sector of the front during this time a stiff battle was fought with the forces of X US Corps and the III and I ROK Corps. In spite of the fact that on the first days of the offensive the 3^rd and 5^th KPA Armies had no success, they did force the enemy to not be able to maneuver with his reserves. Moreover, the enemy command was forced move the 7^th US and 7^th ROK Infantry Divisions, which were in reserve, closer to the front.

Combat operations by the CPV and KPA forces were carried out under very harsh conditions. Enemy aviation continuously bombed and attacked them during the four days of combat on the battlefield and in assembly areas and inflicted significant losses. Due to this reason the offensive had to be predominantly carried out at night.

On the night of 26 April the CPV and KPA forces on the west and central sectors of the front began the offensive again after a short pause. The enemy, after carrying up a partial regrouping of their forces, attempted to put up resistance. In the battle northeast of Yidenpu the newly arrived 28^th British Infantry Brigade was sent into combat. But at the same time, under the blows from the Chinese Volunteers and the Peoples Army the enemy was forced to withdraw to the south under the protection of a rear guard.

More and more frequently, the American and South Korean forces went over to the counterattack against the pursuing Chinese Volunteers with the support of artillery, aviation and tanks. The counterattacks were short, sharp and surprising.

By the end of the day on 29 April the CPV and KPA forces on the western and central directions had achieved the line Koyan – Yidenpu – Kaphyon - north of Chungchen and over the course of the four-day offensive had covered 10 to 30 kilometers. The average speed of movement was from 2.5 to 7.5 kilometers per day.

In the eastern sector of the front the forces of the 3^rd and 5^th KPA Armies drove the enemy forces from their defensive positions on 26 April. In order to restore their positions, the enemy sent the units of the 7^th US and 7^th and 9^th ROK Infantry Divisions into combat, but there were forced to withdraw. Pursuing the enemy units, by the end of the day on 29 April the 3^rd and 5^th KPA Armies had moved 10-15 kilometers and taken the line Teguni – Gomalgol – Mul’chi. The average speed of movement was 2.5-3.5 kilometers per day.

Together with the difficult material support to the forces, where there was a critical need for ammunition and provisions, as well as their physical exhaustion, the Unified Command decided to halt the offensive and get their forces back in order. For that reason, during the course of the offensive from 22 to 29 April the CPV and KPA had inflicted heavy losses on the American and South Korean forces. During that time the enemy suffered up to 20,000 men and officers killed, wounded and captured; they shot down 81 and damaged 20 enemy aircraft; knocked out 76 tanks, 165 trucks and 18 guns. The forces captured the following trophy items: 236 guns and mortars, 490 machine guns, 3,600 rifles, carbines and submachine guns, 39 tanks, 498 trucks and many other items of military goods.

During the course of the offensive the UN forces had been thrown back 10-50 kilometers. The average speed of the offensive by the CPV and KPA forces on the western and central sectors of the front was 6-7 kilometers a day. But in spite of that, the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army were not able to achieve their established goals. Retaining great mobility and superiority in the air, the enemy avoided destruction and pulled back to well-prepared defensive lines south of the 38^th Parallel.

A limiting factor in achieving results in this offensive by the CPV and KPA forces was the result of a break in command and control. Units had to frequently halt to amend their mission tasks, organize cooperation, and put themselves in order and that had a great deal to do with the inference with achieving success.

Defensive operations by the Chinese Volunteers and Korean Peoples Army from 30 April to 15 May 1951. With the goal of preparing for a new offensive operation, as well as to provide the forces of the CPV and KPA with the freedom to maneuver and avoid unnecessary losses to enemy artillery and air strikes, the Unified Command decided to halt their forces for 10-12 days in the following regions: 1^st KPA Army – east of Kimchong; the 19^th CPV Army – north of Yidenpu; 3^rd CPV Army – Chongdok – Changdon – Yonchon; 9^th CPV Army – in the area of Kumwha; 3^rd KPA Army – Yangu; 5^th KPA Army – northeast of Indae. During this time the forces would be brought up to strength and have material reserves replaced.

In order to hold the lines taken it was proposed to take one infantry division from each Korean army and one corps from each Chinese Volunteer army. For this goal, overall 12 infantry divisions were allocated, of which ten had to be in the west and central sectors of the front covering a distance of 100 kilometers. On average one infantry division would have to cover 10 kilometers of front. On the eastern sector of the front, covering some 70 kilometers, were two divisions from the 3^rd and 5^thKPA Armies.

On the night of 1 May the main bodies of the 3^rd and 9^th CPV Armies were withdrawn. On the front Yidenpu – Chongchonni only units of the 40^th and 39^th CPV Corps were left behind.

The main bodies of the 1^st, 3^rd and 5^th KPA Armies and 19^th CPV Army were withdrawn on the night of 2 May. On the front southwest of Yidenpu only the 65^th CPV Corps remained. By 5 May all of the CPV and KPA armies were completely concentrated in their assigned areas.

During this period of time the formations of Chinese Volunteers, covering the withdrawal of the main bodies, succeeded in the western and central sectors to not only rebuff all attacks by the enemy, but push the American and South Korean forces back 5-10 kilometers to the south. In this the 39^th CPV Corps was able to force the Bukhan River from the march to the east of Kaphyon and take the major populated area and road junction, the city of Chungchen .

In order to halt the offensive by the Chinese Volunteers, the 8^th US Army command sent the 25^th US Infantry Division into combat northeast of Seoul , and east of Yanphen the 2^nd and 6^th ROK Infantry Divisions. The 7^th US Infantry Division, which was located in the area of Honchen, was transferred to Yanphen. Sending the three infantry divisions into combat succeeded in the western and central sectors of the front in stopping the offensive by the 65^th, 40^th and 39^th CPV Corps.

By 5 May the front followed the line north of Seoul – east of Chungchen – Ononni – Mul’chi. By this time the enemy had nine infantry divisions and two infantry brigades along the 100 kilometers of the front from Seoul to Ononni.

The American and South Korean forces, having established that only isolated units of the Korean and Chinese forces remained in front of them, went over to the offensive across the entire front on 6 May. The main body of UN forces was concentrated on the western sector with the goal of shattering the front of the Chinese Volunteers and taking the most important lines and centers of communications north of the 38^th Parallel – Pyongkan, Chorwon, and Kumhwa.

On 6 May the enemy pushed the formations of the 1^st KPA Army and the 65^th CPV Corps back and by the end of the day took Yidenpu. Simultaneously the 2^nd and 6^th ROK Infantry Divisions succeeded in forcing the Bukhan River south of Kaphyon and seized a bridgehead on its left bank. On this day the 1^st Marine Division smashed into units of the 39^th CPV Corps and on 7 May took Chungchen.

Starting on the morning of 8 May American and South Korean forces continued the offensive across the entire front. During the course of combat operations succeeded in driving back the units of the 1^st KPA Army and taking Kimchong. All attempts by the I US Corps to develop the strike from the area of Yidenpu along the road to Chongdok were successfully rebuffed by the units of the 19^th CPV Army.

On the central sector of the front the enemy, concentrating the 28^th British Infantry Brigade and the 2^nd and 6^th ROK Infantry Divisions on the bridgehead southwest of Kaphyon, attacked the formations of the 40^th CPV Corps and, developing the offensive in a northeasterly direction, were fighting a battle for Kaphyon by the end of the day. A further offensive in this direction by the enemy would create a threat of his forces breaking through into the rear area of the 19^th CPV Army and the 38^th Parallel. Studying this, the Unified Command decided to reorganize the formations of the 3^rd and 9^th CPV Armies in the area northwest and northeast of Chungchen. In accordance with these decisions by the Unified Command the 3^rd and 9^th CPV Armies began to regroup.

In order to curb the UN forces in the western sector of the front and not permit them to regroup on the central front, the command of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers decided to launch an offensive on 11 May with the forces of the 19^th CPV Army in the direction of Yidenpu.

At 2200 hours on 9 May, the enemy launched a naval landing of 400 men into the area northwest of Nampo. But at the same time this landing was destroyed by the units of the 6^th KPA Army.

On 10 May the enemy succeeded in sending the 7^th US Infantry Division into combat east of Kaphyon and they seized a bridgehead southwest of Chungchen on the right bank of the Bukhan River, forcing units of the 39^th CPV Corps back 1-2 kilometers to the north. With the withdrawal of the units of the 39^th CPV Corps northwest of Kaphyon a break opened on the seam of the 39^th and 40^th CPV Corps.

Together with the threat of enemy entry into the rear area of the formations of the 19^th CPV Army the CPV command was forced to begin to pull back the formations of the 64^th and 63^rd CPV Corps to the area of Sinhali.

By the morning of 11 May the formations of the 3^rd and 9^th CPV Armies began to concentrate northwest and northeast of Chungchen, which then went right into combat straight from the march.

During this time period, on the eastern sector of the front the formations of the 3^rd and 5^th KPA Armies continued to conduct combat with advancing units of the enemy and slowly withdraw to the north.

Vicious combat continued to take place across the entire front on 12 May. By the end of the day on 15 May the front line ran from northwest of Kimchong – Dokchonni – Sinhali – Chongchonni – Indae – Sokchyo.

For that reason, during the course of the defensive battles the CPV and KPA succeeded in not only providing for the regrouping of their forces and preparing their own main body for a new offensive, but to shatter all attempts by the enemy on the western and central sectors of the front to break through north of the 38^th Parallel. Over the course of seven days of offensive combat the American and South Korean had moved forward only 10-20 kilometers at an average speed of 1.5-3 kilometers per day.

Offensive by the Chinese Volunteers and Korean Peoples Armies from 16 to 20 May 1951. The Unified Command, assessing the situation, came to the conclusion that in spite of the continuing absolute air and naval superiority of the enemy, he did not enjoy superiority on the ground.

In accordance with the overall mission placed before the Chinese Volunteers and the Peoples Army, the Unified Command decided to prepare to conduct a new offensive operation. The general concept of the operation revolved around launching three simultaneous strikes with the goal of splitting the enemy’s frontal defenses, surrounding and destroying his forces in sections.

The strikes had to be launched in this manner: in the western sector by the 19^th CPV Army; in the eastern sector of the front – the 9^th CPV Army and the 2^nd, 3^rd, and 5^th KPA Armies; the 1^st KPA Army and the 3^rd CPV Army had to, by advancing in their zones, correspondingly operate with the strike force groupings in carrying out their combat missions.

The operation was planned to move to a depth of 50-60 kilometers to the line Suwon – Wonju – Imokchonni.

In accordance with the concept of the operation the forces were given the following assigned missions. The 1^st KPA Army, advancing from Kimchong in the general direction of Seoul , had to crush the 1^st ROK Infantry Division and in cooperation with the units of the 19^th CPV Army take Seoul .

The 19^th CPV Army had the mission of striking from northwest of Yidenpu to crush the opposing enemy forces and advance on Kwanju and Yanphen, and part of their forces, operating with the 1^st KPA Army, would take Seoul. Ultimately the army would advance on Suwon and Wonju.

The 3^rd CPV Army had the assigned mission of moving from northwest of Chungchen in cooperation with the units of the 9^th CPV Army to crush the 1^stMarine Division and subsequently advance on Honchen.

The 9^th CPV Army received the mission to strike from the area south of Yangu in the direction of Hochen to crush the 2^nd US and 5^th ROK Infantry Divisions. Part of the forces were to advance in the direction of Chaemni and in cooperation with the 2^nd and 3rdf KPA Armies surround and destroy the 7^th and 9^th ROK Infantry Divisions in the area southwest of Indae. Ultimately the arm y was to advance in the direction of Imokchonni.

The 2^nd, 3^rd and 5^th KPA Armies were to advance from northeast of Indae towards the general direction of Imokchonni, and in cooperation with the 9^th CPV Army destroy the 7^th, 9^th, 3^rd, 11^th and Capital ROK Infantry Divisions. Part of the 5^th KPA Army had to advance in the direction of Sanun.

The 4^th, 6^th and 7^th KPA Armies had to continue to carry out the defense of the western and eastern coasts of Korea .

The 13^th CPV Army, forming the reserve of the Unified Command, remained in its previous areas.

By 15 May the main bodies of the 3^rd and 9^th CPV Armies in the central and eastern sectors of the front, per the proposed plan, had taken up their starting positions for the offensive. In the western sector of the front the 19^th CPV Army was not able to regroup its forces, as their formations were still carrying out combat operations on the 60 kilometer front from Yidenpu to Kaphyon.

By this time the first echelon of the American and South Korean forces had 15 infantry divisions and two infantry brigades. As a reserve the corps kept two infantry brigades and one airborne regiment, and as the army’s reserve, one infantry division. The main body of the American and South Korean forces was operating in the western and central sectors of the front. In these sectors the enemy had nine infantry divisions, two infantry brigades and the airborne regiment in reserve in the first echelon and corps reserves. These were the most combat ready and best equipped formations of the UN forces in regard to combat technology.

On the western and central sectors of the front the CPV and KPA had 21 infantry divisions.[16] If they had a nearly two to one superiority in manpower over the enemy, they were significantly inferior in regard to his amount of combat technology.

Against six infantry divisions in the eastern sector of the front, primarily those of the South Korean army, the CPV and KPA side could put forward 21 infantry divisions.[17] This gave them a more than three to one superiority in manpower.

In spite of the fact that the rains had not ceased by 14 May, as well as the fact that the KPA and CPV forces had not succeeded in taking all proper measures foreseen as necessary for the operation, the Unified Command decided to commence its offensive.

At 1800 hours on 16 May, the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army main bodies in all sectors of the front began the offensive.

Initially the enemy put up stiff resistance from prepared defensive positions. Just the artillery from the 2^nd US Infantry Division alone fired 30,000 rounds on 17 May. But at the same time, under the blows from the CPV and KPA the enemy was forced to being a withdrawal under the protection of a rear guard. With the goal of supporting the withdrawal of his force, enemy aviation increased their bombing operations against the advancing formations of the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army.

On 17 May the 19^th CPV Army advanced in the western sector and took Yidenpu and in the central sector the 3^rd CPV Army took Chungchen. In the eastern sector the 9^th CPV, 3^rd KPA and 2^nd KPA Armies crushed units of the 2^nd US and 9^th ROK Infantry Divisions, and, developing the offensive, surrounded units of the 5^th and 7^th ROK Infantry Divisions north of Chaymni. The 5^th KPA Army, advancing along the east coast, took Yayan on this day.

Attempts by the American and South Korean forces to provide assistance to the surrounded units came to naught. By the end of the day on 20 May the enemy units surrounded in the Chaymni area were completely destroyed.

Overcoming enemy resistance, the forces of the 9^th CPV Army and the 3^rd and 5^th KPA Armies continued to move in a southerly direction. The enemy was pursued by the use of forward detachments.

Together with the success of the offensive by the Chinese volunteers and the Korean Peoples Army in the eastern sector the American command was forced to begin regrouping its forces from the western to the central and eastern sectors of the front. Thus the 3^rd US Infantry Division was moved to the Seoul area. The 8^th ROK Infantry Division, which was in reserve for the 8^th US Army in the Chochiwon area, was concentrated in the Chechong area.

The advance of the 1^st KPA Army, the 19^th and 3^rd CPV Armies on 18 and 19 May in the western and central sectors of the front developed slowly. The main bodies of these armies were advancing across a broad front in force groupings which were laid out during the course of the defensive battle. In these sectors of the front the enemy put up stiff resistance and more than once went over to the counterattack. But at the same time, under the blows from the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army they were forced to withdraw to the south.

By the end of the day on 20 May the CPV and KPA had taken the line north of Yongdok – Doksoli – Hongchen – Phunamni – Sanun. The forward detachments of the 9^th CPV Army, the 3^rd and 5^th KPA Armies in the eastern sector of the front had reached the line northeast of Yudonli – Imokchonni – north of Chumunjin.

As then the forces of the CPV and KPA were experiencing a dangerous shortage of ammunition and provisions, as well as their forces needed a rest, the Unified Command decided to halt any further offensive operations.

For that reason, for the five day duration of the offensive the forces of the CPV and KPA had moved forward 20-40 kilometers. The average speed of the offensive was 4-8 kilometers per day. The enemy lost up to 11,500 officers and men killed, wounded or captured. As for captured material they took 113 guns and mortars, 112 bazookas, 31 tanks, 792 trucks, 169 light and heavy machine guns, and 2,174 rifles and pistols, as well as many other items of military technology.

The offensive by the CPV and KPA was prepared and begun under conditions when they where having to fight a heavy defensive action at the front against superior enemy forces. In spite of that fact the Unified Command succeeded in gathering its main body and beginning the operation at the designated time.

The withdrawal of the Chinese Volunteers and the Korean Peoples Army to the line Kaysen – Chorwon – Imdamni – Kodni from 21 May to 9 July 1951. In order to put their forces back in order and replace their material reserves, the Unified Command decided to pull its main body back to the 38^th Parallel. In this it was proposed that the withdrawal of the CPV and KPA forces to the 38^th Parallel would provide for the creation of advantageous conditions for the conduct of negotiations for terminating the war in Korea . The withdrawal would begin on the night of 23 May. It was planned to leave no more than one-third of the forces to defend the line that had been achieved. In case the Americans and South Koreans went over to the offensive it was planned that the defenders along the front would fall back to a line north of Kimchong – Sinypni – Kaphyon – north of Chungchen – Sanun, which was much easier to hold.

Simultaneously it was decided to begin to prepare a line of defense along the line Kaysen – Chorwon – Kumhwa – Chaedin. This line would be held by the main body of the Chinese Volunteers and the Peoples Army in case the Americans and South Koreans penetrated north of the 38^th Parallel and create a threat to develop the offensive in the directions of Pyongyang and Wonsan .

In accordance with these decisions, the forces were given the following missions:

The 1^st KPA Army, holding the front with one infantry division, would withdraw its main body to the area south of Kaysen.

The 19^th CPV Army was ordered to leave one corps to hold the line Yidenpu – Sanyuli and the main body would withdraw to the areas of Kimchong, Wicholli, and Sibili.

The 3^rd CPV Army would leave one corps to hold the front from Sanyuli to north of Honchen, the rest of the corps forces pulling back to the areas of Chorwon and Kumhwa.

The 9^th CPV Army would hold the line Honchen – Phunamni with one infantry division, while the main body would pull back to the area northwest of Hwachen.

The 5^th, 3^rd and 2^nd KPA Armies were ordered to defend the sector of the front from Phunamni to Sanun with two infantry divisions while the rest of their main bodies pulled back to the area northeast of Indae.

Knowing from on their experience from preceding battles that the Chinese and Korean forces would normally pull their main bodies back from the front to their rear areas after an offensive, the American command decided to seize the moment. In order to interfere with the planned withdrawal of Chinese Volunteers and the Peoples Army, the first echelon divisions of the 8^th US Army were ordered to begin an offensive using forward detachments. The forward detachments at division level consisted of one or two infantry battalions, one-three companies of tanks, and artillery and engineer subunits.

On the night of 21 May, in accordance with the decisions of the Unified Command, the CPV and KPA forces began to reorganize so that on 23 May the main body could pull back to the line of the 38^th Parallel.

Starting on the morning of 21 May American and South Korean forces on the western and central sectors of the front went over to the offensive after an artillery and aerial bombardment. The changeover to the offensive by the enemy was unexpected by the Chinese Volunteers and the Peoples Army.

As a result the CPV and KPA forces were forced to start their withdrawal to the 38^th Parallel earlier than was planned.

On 21 May the formations of the 65^th CPV Corps abandoned Yidenpu in the western sector of the front. After stiff battles northeast of Kimchong on 22 May, the 1^st KPA Army abandoned Munsan and pulled back to the right bank of the Imjin River . By the end of the day on 22 May the 19^th CPV Army, under heavy blows from the enemy, was forced to withdraw to the line Dokchonni-north of Kaphyong.

After terrible battles on 21 and 22 May in the central sector of the front, the formations of the 3^rd CPV Army likewise abandoned their defensive positions and pulled back 10-15 kilometers to the north.

In order to develop the offensive in the direction of Ononni the command of the 8^th US Army sent the 3^rd US Infantry Division into combat on 23 May from its positions northeast of Honchen. The introduction of this enemy division not only pushed back the units of the 15^th CPV Corps of the 3^rd CPV Army, but it created a threat to cut off the route of withdrawal of the 9^th CPV Army as well.

In order to not permit an enemy breakthrough in the area of Ononni, the Unified Command sent in the 27^th and 12^th CPV Corps from the 9^th CPV Army.

The formations of the 9^th CPV Army, as well as the 2^nd, 3^rd and 5^th KPA Armies on the eastern front, began to withdraw to the 38^th Parallel on 23 May under the cover of rear guard detachments.

In order to interfere with the withdrawal of the 9^th CPV Army, on 24 May the enemy launched an air assault into the area northeast of Ononni using four transports; these forces were destroyed by units of the 9^th CPV Army.

In consideration of the threat of enemy naval landings on the east coast in the areas of Koje and Koson, the Unified Command sent the 3^rd KPA Army into reserve. On 26 May this army was concentrated in the area of Senan.

By the end of the day on 26 May the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army were carrying out combat operations along the front Munsan – Donduchen – north of Chungchen – Ononni – Phunamni – north of Chumunjin. Over six days of stiff battles the forces of the CPV and KPA on the western and central sectors of the front had withdrawn 25-30 kilometers.

With the goal of taking the area of Chorwon – Kumhwa – Pyongkan, as well as important points along the east coast – the cities of Yayan and Konzan – on 27 May the enemy renewed his offensive in all sectors of the front. In spite of all of the efforts of the CPV and KPA, the enemy succeeded in the western sector of the front in pushing back the units of the 65^th CPV Corps of the 19^th CPV Army and on 28 May took Chongdok. On that same day the American command sent the 25^th Canadian Infantry Brigade into combat on the Unchong direction.[18]

On the morning of 30 May the Americans landed a naval landing of up to 500 men on the west coast in the area southwest of Nampo. By noon the units of the 6^th KPA Army had thrown this landing back into the sea.

By the end of the day on 30 May the front had moved to the line Munsan – Yongchon – Hwachen – south of Yangu – north of Indae – Iyonchiri.

For four days of this offensive the formations of the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army had withdrawn under combat on the western and central sectors a distance of 15-20 kilometers; in the eastern sector, they had pulled back 35-40 kilometers.

In conjunction with the breakthrough of the South Koreans in the western and central sectors of the front north of the 38^th Parallel, the enemy had created a threat to seize important communications nodes of the CPV and KPA forces in the Chorwon – Kumhwa – Pyongkan triangle. Taking these areas woucl create unacceptably advantageous conditions for offensives along the Pyongyang and Wonsan directions.

In order to not permit the enemy to breakthrough into the Chorwon – Kumhwa – Pyongkan area, the Unified Command ordered the 3^rd CPV Army to take up the defense along the line Daykori – Mun’hon’li. In order to cover the Pyongyang direction, two corps from the 13^th CPV Army (the 42^nd and 47^th) were allocated to its defense. The 47^th CPV Corps had to concentrate in the area of Namchyon – Singye by 16 June; the 42^nd CPV Corp was to move into the area of Inchen – Men.[19] The defense on the Wonsan direction was given to the 20^th and 26^th CPV Corps of the 9^th CPV Army. Simultaneously the Unified Command ordered the commander of the 13^th CPV Army to bring the formations of the 38^th, 39^th, 40^th and 50^th CPV Army corps up to combat readiness.

At 1800 hours on 31 May, under cover of aviation and with naval gunfire bombardment support, the Americans put ashore a naval landing on the east coast in the area of Chan’dyon consisting of one infantry regiment. By 1 June this landing had succeeded in taking Koson. Units of the 15^th KPA Infantry Division of the 3^rd KPA Army were sent in to destroy this landing force. After a terrible battle, on 3 June the 15^th KPA Infantry Division destroyed the naval landing and took Koson.

After a break, on 2 June the American and South Korean forces renewed the offensive across the entire front.

On 4 June the 1^st ROK Infantry Division succeeded in forcing the Imjin River west of Munsan and seized a bridgehead for UN forces in the vicinity of Kaysan, and formations of the 64^th CPV Corps of the 19^th CPV Army were sent in to prevent a breakthrough. Due to heavy losses, the 1^st KPA Army was forced to withdraw to the area of Tsogam.

Over the course of 2 and 3 June, the American and South Korean forces in the western and central sectors of the front, running into stiff resistance from the 19^th, 3^rd and 9^th CPV Armies, did not have any success. All of their attacks were repulsed. In order to take Chorwon and Kumhwa by 4 June, the American command reorganized the 3^rd US and 9^thROK Infantry Divisions in the eastern sector of the front in the Chandong area and the 7^th ROK Infantry Division in the Hwachen area.

Starting on the morning of 5 June, American and South Korean forces went over to the offensive. In spite of the stiff resistance and counterattacks by the Chinese Volunteers, they broke through the defenses of the 19^th and 3^rd CPV Armies on the line north of Yonchon – Unchong and by the end of the day on 6 June had taken Daykori and Mun’hon’li. The Americans and South Koreans had created a threat to break through to Pyongkan. The Unified Command, in order to deny their offensive further success on this direction, decided to pull the forces of the 3^rd CPV Army back to a new defensive line along the line Chorwon – Kumhwa. Simultaneously the 42^nd and 47^th CPV Corps of the 13^th CPV Army began to move back to the line Suuk – Munpori where they would replace units of the 19^th and 3^rd CPV Armies.

Starting on the morning of 8 June, and accompanied by their artillery, after a heavy artillery bombardment the American and South Korean forces, with tanks in support as well, attacked the forces of the 19^th, 3^rd and 9^th CPV Armies along the line north of Daykori – Mun’hon’li –Tykul’. Here for the first time the American command used helicopters to drop off small air assaults in the rear of the Chinese Volunteers 2-3 kilometers behind the front. But at the same time these assaults enjoyed no success and were rapidly wiped out by CPV forces.

On 11 June, after suffering heavy losses from enemy air strikes, the formations of the 3^rd and 9^th CPV Armies pulled out of Chorwon and Kumhwa. In order to not permit further enemy advances to the north, the 47^th, 42^nd, and 26^th CPV Corps were sent into combat. With the introduction of those corps into combat, the formations of the 19^th and 3^rd CPV Armies were sent back to the rear area.

Meeting stiff resistance from the 47^th and 42^nd CPV Corps of the 13^th CPV Army and the 26^th and 20^th CPV Corps of the 9^th CPV Army, the enemy was forced to go on the defensive along the line west of Chongdok – north of Chorwon – Kumhwa – Tankori.

In the eastern sector, between 2 and 11 June the forces of the 5^th and 2^nd KPA Armies continued to fight a heavy defensive battle. Due to the stiff resistance put up by the forces of the 5^th and 2^nd KPA Armies, the enemy in this sector was forced to go over to the defense.

By the end of the day on 12 June the front line ran along from northwest of Munsan – west of Chongdok – Chorwon – Kumhwa – Tankori – Hill 1315 – Kodin. For ten days the withdrawal of the CPV and KPA forces in the western and central sectors had covered 15-20 kilometers, and in the east it had covered 15-30 kilometers.

Having not achieved success in the preceding days, the American command decided to narrow the front of their attacks and concentrated their main effort on the Wonsan direction.

After an artillery and aviation bombardment on 13 June, the 3^rd US and 25^th US Infantry Divisions and the 25^th Canadian Infantry Brigade went over to the offensive, launching their main strike along the railroad to Pyongkan. The enemy attack took on a particularly violent nature. The enemy was striving to break through in the Pyongkan region at any cost. Combat operations were carried out day and night. Numerous attempts by the Chinese Volunteers to eliminate the enemy force grouping in the area south of Pyongkan did not meet with success. This created a tense situation. The enemy threatened to break through in the area north of Pyongkan. Under that situation the Unified Command decided to pull back the 26^th and 20^th CPV Corps to new positions north and northeast of Pyongkan.

On 16 June units of the 26^th CPV Corps left Pyongkan and took up the defense north and northeast of that settlement. All attempts by the enemy to develop their offensive along the railroad to the north did not meet with success.

On the night of 18 June, after getting themselves in order, the 26^th and 20^th CPV Corps themselves went over to the offensive and during the day on 18 June once again took Pyongkan. In spite of the fact that they put up stiff opposition, the American forces were forced to hastily pull back to the south. By the end of the day on 22 June the Chinese Volunteers had taken up their previous positions north of Chorwon and Kumhwa. During this time along the other sectors of the front commensurate changes in the positions of the force grouping of troops also took place.

In order to strengthen the coastal defense the Unified Command decided to concentrate the newly formed 20^th CPV Army (67^th and 68^th CPV Corps) in the area south of Wonsan . Concentration of this army in this area was planned to be completed by 13 June 1951.

With the goal of moving into the Yenan and Kaysen areas and up to the 38^th Parallel, at the end of June the American command proposed an offensive using the forces of the 1^st ROK Infantry Division.

The enemy succeed in pushing back units of the 64^th CPV Corps and by 1 July had taken Kaysen, as well as inserted a naval landing on a cape southeast of Yenan. But at the same time, as the result of counterattacks by units of the 1^st KPA Army and the 64^th CPV Corps the enemy forces were crushed; the remnants fled to the left bank of the Imjin River.

Starting on 1 July the warring sides along the entire front switched over to the defense.

For that reason, during the course of combat operations that had continued for a month and a half the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army had succeeded in not only stymieing the enemy, but they also shattered every attempt he made to break through into the depths of the territory of North Korea. Just during the period 6-25 June 1951 the enemy lost more than 28,000 men and officers killed, wounded or captured.

During the course of combat operations lasting from 22 April to 9 July 1951 the American and South Korean forces lost more than 60,000 men and officers killed, wounded or captured. The breakdown of the offensive strategy of the American command in Korea was completely obvious.

Combat operations by the CPV and KPA during this period had a sharp impact on the further growth of their operational art and tactics. By increasing the combat skills of the forces, they were able to seize upon the most modern accepted methods of combat, and their tactics became more flexible and maneuver based. There was a growth in the art of the command in preparing their forces for combat operations and directing them in battle. During offensive operations the forces were able to set decisive goals, and concentrate their forces along the axes of the main strikes. But at the same time the consequences of an insignificant amount of combat technology, especially aviation, forced them to carry out their offensives as essentially a linear form of combat, moving from line to line, as their only concepts were to capture, force back or surround and destroy enemy force groupings.

The defense by the CPV and KPA during this period was flexible, stiff and aggressive. The depth of the defense was supported by corresponding structuring of the forces and the advantageous ability to create defensive lines in the rear area. The aggressive defense was achieved by the broad use of maneuver by forces and means, as well as the conduct of counterattacks against the enemy force groupings as they tried to break through into the depths of the defense.

With the hopes of terminating the bloodshed in Korea , the Soviet Union moved to propose the conclusion of a ceasefire in Korea during June 1951.

Via their UN representative, on 23 June the Soviet government stated: “The Soviet people are sure of the quality of the first steps that will follow to begin negotiations between the warring powers for a ceasefire, and a peaceful withdrawal of forces from the 38^th Parallel.”[20]

Under pressure from societal opinion and the growth of a peace movement the government of the USA was forced to seek for open negotiations for a ceasefire.

At a preliminary meeting held on 8 July representatives of the warring sides carried out preparatory measures for opening the establishment of negotiations on a ceasefire.

Overall Results. Combat operations by the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army during the third stage of the war lasted more than eight months, from 25 October 1950 until 9 July 1951.

This stage of the war was fractured. There was a break in the course of the war that came about as a result of the entry into it by the Chinese Peoples Volunteers, which permitted the government of the DPRK to bring about order and restore a considerable amount of its armed forces. During the course of the third stage of the war the Chinese Volunteers and the Peoples Army liberated the territory of the DPRK from UN forces and inflicted heavy damage upon them. According to incomplete data, the enemy lost more than 100,000 men and officers killed, wounded and captured.

The successes achieved by the CPV and KPA had important operational-strategic significance. In spite of their furious efforts the UN forces were not able to achieve commensurate results, not to speak of the disruption to their important strategic mission.

Nature of the Operations of the Chinese Volunteer and the Peoples Army Forces. Combat operations by the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army during the third stage of the war were characterized by the adoption of varied forms of organization and the conduct of armed combat under various conditions of the situation.

Combat operations took on a decisive nature, placing a strain on the sides to fight to seize and maintain the initiative. This was the stage of aggressive maneuver combat, during which the offensive operations in combat by the CPV and KPA that also considered defensive operations and planed withdrawals. The skillful and economical consideration of offensive operations with defensive and planned withdrawals, as well as focused efforts, solid performance and giving support to the question of raising and using reserves, in spite of several tactical reverses, permitted the CPV and KPA to achieve their commensurately established goals.

It was characteristics that in the offensive operations conducted by the CPV and KPA in October and November 1950 that there was no sharply reflected massing of forces and means on the directions of the main strikes, but rather a relatively even distribution of forces and means along the front. This is clarified by the lack of UN forces having an interlocking and solid defense during that time.

During the offensive operations in the first half of 1951, with the changeover by American and South Korean forces to combat operations across the entire front, the massing of force along the decisive directions began to find broader acceptance.

In view of the shortage of artillery forces, mortars, engineer means, tanks and aviation, the primary burden of combat with UN forces was placed on the infantry. Therefore on the directions of the main strikes the CPV and KPA forces only were superior to the enemy in their numbers of infantry. Striving to make maximum use of that superiority, the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army offensives were primarily carried out at night or under unfavorable weather conditions, which limited the use of American aviation. Under those conditions when the enemy was severely depleted, combat was carried out during daylight hours as well.

Night operations under conditions where the enemy had superiority in tanks, artillery and aviation was the only method by which they could achieve their goals. Darkness significantly weakened flexible operations by the technology of the UN armed forces, especially their aviation. Surprise night attacks had a significant morale effect on the enemy both at the point of the attack as well as in neighboring sectors. Night operations by the CPV and KPA were successfully carried out not only at the tactical level, but against operational missions as well. By deploying forces across a broad front and organizing them for simultaneous strikes upon the enemy on several directions the command succeed in significantly reducing losses among their forces from air strikes and enemy artillery fire.

The Unified Command was constantly giving its forces missions to move towards nd surround individual enemy subunits, units and formations, divide them up and destroy them. But at the same time the use of flexible approaches and encirclement of major enemy force groupings of troops without mobile formations and in cooperation with aircraft was an especially difficult task.

The framework of the majority of offensive operations carried out by the CPV and KPA did not exceed 50 kilometers in depth and a average speed of advance of 6-8 kilometers per day. The time given to these operations ran from five to nine days. The comparatively modest depth and duration of these offensive operations is explained by the primary reason of the difficulty in supplying the forces with ammunition and provisions both when preparing for the operation as well as during the course of combat operations, and therefore the Unified Command only had a limited capability to conduct a long and continuous offensive battle. A major influence on the slow speed of combat operations was due to the frequent halts in the offensive to restore cooperation and put their forces back in order.

When preparing for offensive operations, and with a goal of concealment and avoiding losses to American air strikes, the forces only closed with the enemy during the hours of darkness. Taking up starting positions also took up a niche of one-two days prior to the start of the attack, in order to not give away the concept or time of the start of the operation. The Unified Command avoided mass troop concentrations in very narrow sectors prior to the offensive. At their starting positions the troops carefully concealed themselves and used maskirovka, studied the terrain and the enemy defenses and took those measures necessary for combat and material support. Divisional, regimental and battalion commanders amended their troops’ missions according to the terrain and organized cooperation.

The CPV and KPA forces frequently went over to the attack without artillery preparation, so their strikes were launched suddenly and quickly. The advancing forces avoided moving along roads and open terrain in order to limit the ability of enemy artillery to launch massed fires on the combat order of the troops and to use tanks to counterattack.

Simultaneously with the offensive by the main body of forces, part of the forces at the front, making use of the intervals in the enemy’s defenses, approached his units and subunits from the flanks and rear and penetrated into the depths of his defenses, falling on his artillery positions and command posts, disrupting his communications, command and control, and work by his rears services.

Experience shows that the Chinese Volunteers and the Peoples’ Army achieved their greatest success on the first night of the offensive. The surprise attacks on the enemy forced him to have to withdraw.

With the beginning of the withdrawal of UN forces, the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army went over to the pursuit of the enemy using forward detachments. The main body of forces moved behind these forward detachments in dispersed combat order or stayed in concealed positions until nightfall. The forward detachments, not stopping their combat operations either day or night, strove to not permit the enemy to take up the defense lines in intermediary positions. But at the same time, they were significantly inferior to the enemy in the area of mobility, usually quickly losing contact with them, and accordingly turned to the role of combat security.

In view of the exclusive difficulty and complexity of offensive operations in mountainous conditions at night, as well as having the goal of playing for time, the Unified Command occasionally continued combat operations during daylight hours. When advancing during the daytime the formations and units used a more dispersed combat order, strove to make more careful use of maskirovka and employ the natural cover offered by the conditions of the terrain.

When advancing in the operational structure of an army, the combat order of the army corps and infantry divisions normally was placed in two echelons. Two-thirds of the forces were in the first echelon and one third in the second. The infantry regiments and battalions likewise held back one-third of their strength as either their second echelon or their reserve.

After a battle was concluded, the Chinese Volunteers more often than not conducted a sweep of the terrain to uncover enemy troops who were dispersed.

During the conduct of an operation, when necessary the forces of the CPV and KPA would halt a successful offensive and go over to a preplanned withdrawal.

The first withdrawal took place during the period 20 February to 21 April 1951. By studying this withdrawal, it can be seen to have been promptly implemented and tightly planned. The withdrawal of the forces was planned to move back by phase lines and times in consideration of the combat capabilities of the enemy and the nature of his operations. To support this planned withdrawal, three lines were laid out at intervals of 15-20 kilometers apart, which permitted the forces to move from one to the next in a single night. The lines were chosen for their terrain, natural obstacles on each flank, good visibility to their front, and cover for the secure movement of troops to the rear area. The withdrawal of the main body was completed under the cover of rear guards consisting of from one to several infantry battalions in strength, drawn from each of the infantry divisions. In order to hold the enemy for a long time on these lines, the main body of CPV and KPA forces placed their combat order, as is correct, in two echelons. With this goal in mind they practiced simultaneously occupying two lines with their forces. The troops covering the withdrawal would move back to a set line at night.

The second withdrawal of the CPV and KPA forces took place in the period 22 May to 12 June 1951. The withdrawal was planned to be carried out under the cover of rear guards without holding the main body at intermediary lines. But at the same time, in conjunction with the fact that the forces of the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army were locked in combat at the front with the enemy, the withdrawal of the main body could not be secretly carried out. The withdrawal under these conditions was carried out under more difficult conditions than during February-April 1951. The CPV and KPA were forced to send their main body into combat along several directions and fight a stiff battle of resistance under disadvantageous conditions. The corresponding experience of the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army during the second withdrawal once more showed the significance of secrecy and surprise in the withdrawal.

During the third stage of the war the CPV and KPA made wide use of defensive operations.

In view of the enemy’s superiority in fire support means the CPV and KPA forces in the defense strove to avoid long, stiff battles in one and the same positions and made wide use of maneuver and changing positions. The first line of the defense had up to one-third of the forces allocated to it and up to half of the fire support means. The main body of forces was concentrated in the depths of the defense in readiness to carry out a counterattack.

The positions taken up for defense by the forward units and subunits were chosen for their superior height, which provided good visibility. False positions and dummy weapons were placed on the heights which were not occupied, and minefields and ambushes were placed in those sectors where there was a danger of tank attacks. A heavy combat security was placed out in front of the defending forces. In order to provide maskirovka and concealment of forces from enemy artillery fire and air strikes, they were provided with a large number of reserve bunkers and trenches.

During periods of enemy preparatory artillery and aerial bombardment units took up observation positions while the main body pulled back under cover. When fires shifted into the depths of the defense they once again took up their positions and used counterattacks to repulse the enemy.

When there was an unfavorable correlation of forces, as well as with the goal of taking up more favorable lines of defense in the rear area, the CPV and KPA forces, under the cover of a rear guard, would pull back at nightfall to new defensive lines, forcing the enemy to once again reorganize his offensive operations.

The Unified Command was most successful during this stage of the war in taking measures to organize the defense against naval landings. By the end of this phase of the war the defense of the east and west coasts was able to prevent surprise naval landings by the enemy and even the most unexpected strikes into the ear area from troops located along the front lines.

The CPV and KPA forces made use of special characteristics with their artillery by decentralizing its execution. During the third phase of the war they made use of the larger amount of howitzer artillery available. But at the same time the density of artillery allocated to the combat order of the forces was not high – 6-9 guns and mortars per kilometer of front.

In spite of the difficulty of making combat use of artillery under the conditions of mountain-forest terrain when operating at night, artillery and mortar units and subunits were able to provide effective fire support to advancing infantry, hitting the enemy with surprise fire from close range. Artillery made wide use of direct fire engagements.

The aviation which was at the disposal of the Unified Command was used during the third phase of the war to cover objects in the rear area.

The primary engineer methods used during this phase to support offensive forces were: maskirovka and cover for personnel and combat technology from artillery and mortar fire and air strikes; movement support, especially for artillery and truck transport; organization of water crossings; de-mining and removal of enemy obstacles. In the defense and during the withdrawal of forces engineer units took part in strengthening lines and creating various obstacles along the enemy route of advance.

The conduct of combat operations under difficult conditions demanded the organization of continuous combat support for the CPV and KPA forces. But at the same time this question brought up serious problems and omissions.

Some divisions and units carried out poor reconnaissance against the enemy. Commanders and staffs were limited in overall data and usually received information from higher headquarters or were only able to organize observation of the enemy. This led to the fact that forces were suddenly faced with obstacles, found themselves under enemy fire and took losses. Such shortcomings were also found in terrain analysis by the forces. Not infrequently formations and units found themselves having to change places many times due to unfamiliarity with the terrain and when they ran into the enemy found themselves severely fatigued from long marches in the mountains.

The greatest deal of attention in the CPV and KPA forces was paid to flank and seam support. Covering the flanks of the group armies called for corresponding special allocation of formations for this purpose. On occasion this mission would be headed by an army operating on the flanks. To support the flanks and seams between units and formations the necessary forces were allocated and a specific commander designated to be in charge.

Under conditions of enemy air superiority air defense to the troops became an important question of operational support. During the third phase of the war the organization of air defense was somewhat improved. In the CPV and KPA forces there was a growth in the number of air defense artillery assets, a much more structured system of forward air defense observation was organized as was the creation of roving “enemy aircraft hunters,” and the troops were taught self-defense combat against aircraft.

Groups of 4-7 men armed with machine guns and antitank rifles would be deployed on the heights where they could fire down on low-flying enemy aircraft. The operations of these groups forced the enemy to increase their flight altitude and thus reduce the accuracy of their bombing and ground attack strikes.

In order to reduce truck transport losses to enemy air raids, all of the roads in the rear area where intensive truck traffic took place had a warning system organized. Signal posts were set up every two to three kilometers. When enemy aircraft were detected to be approaching, the posts would send out a signal. All trucks were taken off the roads during the day and camouflaged, and at night they drove with their lights turned off.

Measures were taken to ensure antitank defense along with the use of tank inaccessible terrain for movement of the forces and their deployment, which included: mining the probable direction of movement of enemy tanks, destroying roads and bridges, building antitank ditches in the roads, and blocking passes with earth and rock. In order to combat enemy tanks, as well as using antitank artillery the units and subunits created tank destroyer groups armed with antitank rifles, grenades, bottles filled with fuel, and mines. The tank destroyers, operating from ambush, would open up with surprise fire as tank columns passed along a road and inflicted significant losses on them.

An extremely limiting influence on successful conduct of operations by the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army was due to the shortage of material-technical support to the forces.

Railway and road transportation units of the rear services, in view of the frequent destruction of roads and bridges by enemy aviation, were not able to win through them and provide the forces with ammunition and provisions in a timely manner. Not uncommonly there were occasions when personnel went several days without food or ammunition, which forced them to break off combat operations which had begun successfully.

Command and control of major troop forces under conditions of conducting combat operations in the mountains presented an extremely difficult task. The solution to this task was complicated by the fact that the CPV and KPA forces did not have a sufficient number of communications means, nor trained signalmen, and the command and staffs for the most part did not have any experience controlling combat operations under difficult conditions, so therefore command and control of the forces was marked by breaks in the action.

An important significance in the successful conduct of combat operations by CPV and KPA forces during the third phase of the war came from aggressive operations in the enemy’s rear areas by many partisan detachments from the local populations. By destroying lines of communication, storehouses, airfields, and communications lines serving headquarters and enemy communications nodes, partisan detachments created a stressful situation in the enemy’s rear area. But at the same time due to the difficulty of maintaining communications with them and supplying them with weapons, ammunition and medical supplies, the operations by these detachments took on an isolated nature, which simplified the enemy’s fight against partisans.

Nature of the combat operations by UN forces. During the third phase of the war American and South Korean forces carried out both defensive and offensive operations, as well as being forced to carry out withdrawals.

On the UN side, the third phase of the war was primarily carried out by American and South Korean forces, along with two British, one Canadian and independent Turkish infantry brigades.

Command and control of all UN forces in

Korea

corresponded to the American command, which commensurately saw the conduct of combat operations by the headquarters of the American army.

During the third phase of the war the American command correspondingly was unsuccessful in carrying out neither a single major offensive operation nor a ground forces operation in conjunction with air and naval forces.

The planning for offensive operations, in spite of the fact of the tremendous length of the front and the significant number of forces involved, was frequently tasked by the 8^th US Army command to the corps headquarters. Such an order for planning did not provide for the necessary level of cooperation between corps and led to limiting the scope of the operation. The most widely used operation was a frontal strike along one or two directions. The American command attempted to use the concept of seize and move, but, as is correct, they did not achieve any success. The operational structure of the army during all offensive operations was in a single echelon. For the most part, the combat order of the corps were also in a single echelon. The offensive was preceded by an artillery and aerial preparatory bombardment, which had the goal of maximizing the suppression of CPV and KPA troops and fire support. In this they would expend a great deal of artillery and aerial munitions. But at the same time in view of the fact that the CPV and KPA forces would not concentrate a large mass of troops in one area and were not wedded to the concept of long and deliberate occupation of their positions, the artillery and aerial bombardment did not always achieve its goals. Due to the threat from surprise attacks by Chinese Volunteer and Peoples Army forces, the Americans and South Koreans normally began their offensive operations with forward detachments consisting of combat groups, tactical groups, and tank and infantry groups. The main body of an infantry division moved in dispersed order 10-15 kilometers behind the forward detachment. The offensive was carried out over a broad front. During this a great deal of attention was paid to supporting the flanks and seams between formations and units, in order to achieve the use of artillery and engineer subunits as well as continuous reconnaissance. The offensive was normally carried out by means of sequential taking of objectives and lines. When faced with stiff opposition by CPV and KPA forces, the American and South Korean forces, as is correct, halted their offensive, moved their infantry and tanks back under cover, and used suppressive fire before beginning once again. If after that fire the offensive was halted, then artillery would be sent into this sector as well as reserves and aviation and once again preparations were made to begin the offensive.

The speed of the UN forces after making a breakthrough of the defense was no more than 1-2 kilometers, and when developing the offensive about 3-5 kilometers a day. This consequentially took on a passive nature, as they were simultaneously moving large forces on several directions. These were normally frontal offensives due to the poor skills of the forces, as they would not think of beginning an offensive without artillery and aviation support. With nightfall there was danger from counterattacks by the Chinese Volunteers and Peoples Army, and the American and South Korean forces, as is correct, ceased offensive operations. Formations and units went over to the defense along the lines they had reached or pulled back to more advantageous positions.

The organization and conduct of the defense by American and South Korean forces during the third phase of the war was not identical. In November 1950, during the defense north of the Chongchon River the UN did not create a continuous front. Their primary forces and means were grouped together near the roads. This led to the fact that there were large intervals between formations and units over which they could not even provide observation. The width of the defensive zones of the infantry divisions varied from 12 to 30 kilometers, and the depth of their deployments on the directions of the main roads reached 12-15 kilometers. The defensive positions were constructed from a series of strong points and nodes of resistance, which were able to support each other by fire.

A study of the previous battles in December 1950 showed that when organizing the defense of the 38^th Parallel the UN forces put their defense together to provide for a continuous front. The defensive zones of the infantry divisions was now no more than 15-18 kilometers in frontal area and no more than 7-9 in depth. In this no less than one-third of the division’s forces were held as the second echelon or reserve. The primary defense used the fires from all types of weapons. For this, wide use was made of those weapons in the second echelon, antiaircraft artillery, as well as tanks, which could fire either via direct or indirect engagement. Fire was placed on the area under the maximum amount of stress, without limits as to the expenditure of ammunition. At night artillery and mortars fired on areas; likewise, they fired barrier fires against areas with roads, passes and saddles.

In spite of the high degree of interlocking defenses, when the Chinese Volunteers and the Peoples Army made surprise attacks at night, especially when they penetrated deep into the enemy’s depths, the UN forces did not stay steadfast, but quickly pulled out of their occupied positions and withdrew. The main body left under cover of rear guards and aviation. Units covering the withdrawal took all measures to avoid combat with the pursuing forward detachments of the CPV and KPA forces at close range.

During the offensive and the defense UN forces seldom made use of counterattacks. When they did they were short in duration and used small numbers of infantry with tanks and with air support.

Both in the offense and the defense South Korean artillery was used in a decentralized manner. During the offensive and in the defense American infantry divisions were reinforced by 3-4 battalions of artillery.

In the offensive UN forces used tanks as the main method for forming forward detachments. In the defense the majority of them were used as firing points for direct fire and fire from concealed positions ((e.g. indirect fire.)) Part of the tanks was kept in reserve for operations together with infantry and artillery against CPV and KPA units that broke through the defense. When withdrawing, tanks were used to cover the retreat of their forces.

The primary mission of engineer units and subunits in the offensive was to provide movement support to their forces. Engineer-sapper subunits repaired roads and bridges and cleared all possible obstacles. In the defense the primary mission of engineer units and subunits was to build various obstacles, command posts, artillery positions and cover for their forces. During a withdrawal engineer units blew up and mined roads and bridges and destroyed defensive works and storage areas.

Aviation took a large place among UN forces during the third phase of the war. Having complete air superiority it was a significant influence on the course of combat operations of the ground forces.

During the offensive and the defensive American aviation first and foremost carried out heavy bombing and ground attack strikes on the positions and deployment areas of the CPV and KPA forces formed as a battlefield reserve, as well as disrupt the work of the rear services and supply to the troops. Tight coordination with the ground forces meant that they could continuously support them in combat. Not infrequently groups of aircraft were on call for infantry regimental and battalion commanders and flew to destroy various targets at their direction.

Naval warships and aviation were used to blockade the Korean coasts, fire upon lines of communication of the CPV and KPA forces, support their own forces, make naval landings in the rear of the CPV and KPA forces, as well as support the transfer of their own troops and cargoes by sea.

In the organization of communications and command and control of UN ground forces, it must be stressed that the high degree of interlocking of American formations, units and subunits due to their communications means meant that they maintained continuous communications from higher to lower, could rapidly exchange information and give timely orders and dispositions. In this it is necessary to stress that there was a great deal of distance between command posts and their forces. Thus in the offensive and defensive infantry regimental headquarters were separated from their subunits by 5-8 kilometers and infantry division headquarters were deployed 12-20 kilometers from them, and corps headquarters another 30-40 kilometers back.

[1] Note: This is an updated and edited version of the original 1954 text, and the authors have inserted post-1954 information into the text where it is relative. This expands and modifies many of the original conclusions as well as provides a better view of UN operations generally with the correct units and designations for the opposing side. Translator.

[2] Note: Chinese formations are easy to discern in that generally each element includes three subordinates, and by multiplying or dividing you can determine which parent unit they belong to. E.g. the 148^th, 149^th and 150^th Infantry Divisions would be part of the 50^th Army. Note that there are exceptions, however. Translator.

[3] According to the CPV this counterstrike was called the “First Operation.”

[4] According to materials from the CPV command, these combat operations were dubbed the “Second Operation.”

[5] Includes naval aviation.

[6] At the end of November 1950 these units were used to form the 2^nd KPA Army. Southwest of Supungdon and defending the hydroelectric power station and Yalu River crossings was the 163^rd CPV Infantry Division.

[7] The 1^st KPA Group Army was renamed as the 1^st KPA Army on 18 November.

[8] According to materials from the CPV command, these combat actions were called the Third Operation.

[9] The count of the formations of the 38^th, 39^th, 40^th and 50^th CPV Armies of the 13^th CPV Group Army and the 1^st KPA Army counts the artillery of these formations, as well as the artillery of one artillery division and an artillery regiment from the reserve of the high command.

[10] The 24^th and 25^th US Infantry Divisions, the 1^st and 6^th ROK Infantry Divisions, the 27^th and 29^th British Infantry Brigades, and the 187^th RCT. When considering the correlation of forces these three brigades and the airborne regiment were counted as two divisions.

[11] According to materials from the CPV command these combat operations were termed the Fourth Operation.

[12] At the end of February 1951 all of the group armies and CPV armies were redesignated: the group armies became armies, and the armies became corps. The 105^th Tank Division of the KPA was redesignated as the 105^th Mechanized Division. Therefore subsequent material drawn from that source will use the new designations.

[13] In February 1951 the 26^th CPV Corps of the 9^th CPV Army was resubordinated to the 13^th CPV Army.

[14] The 8^th KPA Army at this time had completed concentrating the area northwest of Wonsan .

[15] According to materials from the CPV Command these combat operations comprised the Fifth Operation.

[16] The 1^st KPA Army had three infantry divisions, and the 19^th and 3^rd CPV Armies had 18 infantry divisions.

[17] The 2^nd, 3^rd and 5^th KPA Armies had 9 infantry divisions, and the 9^th CPV Army (the 20^th, 26^th and 27^th CPV Corps) had 12 infantry divisions.

[18] The 25^th Canadian Infantry Brigade arrived in Korea in mid May 1951. The 27^th British Infantry Brigade was sent back to England .

[19] The 47^th CPV Corps (two infantry divisions) arrived in Korea at the end of April, and by early May 1951 was part of the 13^th CPV Army where it was used for airfield construction.

[20] “Pravda”, 24 June 1951

Element	CPV and KPA Forces			Forces of the 8^th US Army			Ratio
Element	CPV	KPA	Total	US et al	ROK	Total	Ratio
Divisions	18	4	22*	6	6	12**	1.8:1
Personnel	203,640	32,840	236,480	123,000	88,000	211,000	1.1:1
Guns 76mm and up 45mm and 57mm and 75mm RR 37mm AA and higher	835 81 42	35 20 5	870 101 47	525 637 270	195 127 -	720 764 270	1.2:1 1:7.5 1:5.7
Bazookas – 60mm and 88.9mm	-	-	-	2,639	2,175	4,814	-
Mortars 60mm 81mm and higher	1,512 702	- 60	1,512 762	487 450	562 600	1,049 1,050	1.4:1 1.3:1
Tanks and SP Guns	-	41	41	790	-	790	1:19
Aircraft	-	-	-	1,300***	-	1,300***	-
* Note – this does not consider the 9^th CPV Group Army forces Note – This only considers UN forces operating north of the 38^th Parallel; in this the airborne regiment and the lone brigade are taken as divisional strength * Beside this there were 300 transport aircraft