Chapter 4.
Entry into the War of the Chinese Volunteers. Retreat of UN Forces and the South
Korean Army from the DPRK. Combat Operations in the Areas Adjacent to the 38th
Parallel
(Third Stage of
the War 25 October 1950-9 July 1951)[1]
- The
Situation, Condition and Force Groupings of the Sides at the Start
of the Third Stage of the War
In October 1950 the DPRK and its armed forces found themselves in an exclusively
difficult situation. The weakened forces of the National Army, with up to four
divisions in the 1st KPA Group Army on the Sinuiju direction and the
remnants of the units of the 2nd KPA Group Army on the east coast,
suffering under the strikes by I US and X US Corps and I ROK and II ROK Corps,
were forced to fight under extremely hard conditions while withdrawing into the
depths of the country. On 23 October UN forces captured
Pyongyang
and Hamhung. In reaching the 40th Parallel, they had actually gone
as far as the border with the PRC in several places, threatening its industrial
supply base northeastern
China
.
Together with the situation created and with the goal of turning back the
offensive by South Korean and American forces, as well as to show aid to their
brothers, the Korean people, on 19 October 30 infantry divisions and four
artillery divisions of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers began to move out of
China and into the territory of the DPRK; these were divided up into two group
armies. With the goal of coordinating combat operations of the CPV and the
Peoples Army, a Unified Command was created in which both representatives of the
CPV and KPA served.
The command and control of Korean forces, operating at the front, remained under
the command of the Peoples Army. A representative from the Peoples Army was
located in the headquarters of the CPV forces. In some army and individual corps
headquarters of the CPV there were also representatives from the Korean command
who were essentially liaison officers.
Starting on 25 October the leading units of the 13th CPV Group Army,
located on line west of Uznan
Sanwontong north of Hichen Sangoye Wonpunni, entered into combat
with American and South Korean forces and actively took part in halting the
enemy offensive along that line.
By the end of the day on 28 October the force grouping of troops was as follows.
On the right bank of the
Taerkong
River
to Kosandong were the formations of the I US Corps, against whom the forces of
the 1st KPA Group Army were defending. Northwest of Uznan, which was
covered by the lead units of the 1st ROK Infantry Division, were the
units of the 39th CPV Army. In the Bugdin region and to the northeast
were the operating forces of the 40th CPV Army, which had halted the
offensive by the 6th ROK Infantry Division. The formations of the 38th
CPV Army, having arrived in the area north of Hichen, halted further movement by
the units of the 8th ROK Infantry Division. The 42nd CPV
Army, halting the offensive by the 3rd ROK and Capital Infantry
Divisions, was fighting along the line Sinpun north of Sangoye Wonpunni.
In reserve the CPV command held its 50th CPV and 66th CPV
Armies, which were moving from the
Antung
region in the direction of Tonju. The 148th CPV Infantry Division of
the 50th CPV Army was concentrated on
Tsinan
.[2]
In the Sakju area and southeast were concentrated the 1st, 2nd
and 8th CPV Artillery Divisions. Beside these forces in
Korea
, the forces of the 9th CPV Group Army were also moving into the
country.
Along the east coast the formations of the I ROK Corps were chasing the remnants
of the 2nd KPA Group Army to the north. Along this direction the X US
Corps had two divisions in the Hamhung area, which had been dropped in at
Wonsan
and Hamhung after moving by sea from
South Korea
.
For that reason, by 28 October the Unified Command of the CPV and KPA deployed
16 infantry divisions directly at the front or in the near rear areas, as well
as three artillery divisions, one tank and one mechanized division.
Beside that, there were six more infantry divisions allocated as reserves
(not counting the forces of the 9th CPV Group Army.)
The American and South Korean forces north of the 38th Parallel had
11 infantry divisions (six of which were South Korean), one infantry brigade,
and one airborne regiment with reinforcements. Four infantry divisions and one
infantry brigade were in the army reserve and deployed south of the 38th
Parallel. These formations were conducting combat operations against Korean
partisans.
The overall force ratios of the sides at the end of October are shown in Table
7.
Table 7
|
Element
|
CPV
and KPA Forces
|
Forces
of the 8th US Army
|
Ratio
|
|
CPV
|
KPA
|
Total
|
US
et al
|
ROK
|
Total
|
|
Divisions
|
18
|
4
|
22*
|
6
|
6
|
12**
|
1.8:1
|
|
Personnel
|
203,640
|
32,840
|
236,480
|
123,000
|
88,000
|
211,000
|
1.1:1
|
|
Guns
76mm and up
45mm and 57mm and 75mm RR
37mm AA and higher
|
835
81
42
|
35
20
5
|
870
101
47
|
525
637
270
|
195
127
-
|
720
764
270
|
1.2:1
1:7.5
1:5.7
|
|
Bazookas 60mm and 88.9mm
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
2,639
|
2,175
|
4,814
|
-
|
|
Mortars
60mm
81mm and higher
|
1,512
702
|
-
60
|
1,512
762
|
487
450
|
562
600
|
1,049
1,050
|
1.4:1
1.3:1
|
|
Tanks and SP Guns
|
-
|
41
|
41
|
790
|
-
|
790
|
1:19
|
|
Aircraft
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
1,300***
|
-
|
1,300***
|
-
|
|
* Note this does not consider the 9th CPV Group Army
forces
** Note This only considers UN forces operating north of the 38th
Parallel; in this the airborne regiment and the lone
brigade are taken as divisional strength
*** Beside this there were 300 transport aircraft
|
From Table 7 it can
be seen that with the entry into the war of the CPV the force ratio in
personnel, while insignificant, was always in favor of the Chinese Volunteers
and the Peoples Army. But at the same time the numbers and quality of combat
technology (artillery, tanks and aviation) remained superior on the side of the
enemy.
-
Counterstrike
by the 13th CPV Group Army into the Uznan, Hichen, and
Tokchyon Areas (29 October 5 November 1950)[3]
With
the goal of terminating further movement by American and South Korean forces
towards the border of the PRC, the Unified Command decided to launch a
counterstrike against the enemy force grouping that was breaking through in the
Uznan, Sanwontong, and Hichen areas. Preparations for the counterstrike were
carried out on the march as the 13th CPV Group Army assembled in the
northern regions of the DPRK.
Per their plan, the forces had to launch a strike from the Techyon arfea and
north of Hichen in the general direction of Nonbatong, destroy the enemy in the
areas of Uznan, Hichen, north of Kudangdon, and move to the
Chongchon
River
line.
In
accordance with the concept of the operation, the forces received the following
missions:
The 39th
CPV Army was ordered to launch a strike from the area north of Techyon in the
direction of Nonbatong, meeting up with the 38th CPV Army and
together crushing the 1st, 6th and 8th ROK
Infantry Divisions. The 38th CPV Army had to advance from the Hichen
area in the direction of Nonbatong.
The
forces of the 40th CPV Army received orders to simply hold the enemy
forces along the line Uznan Sanwontong and then go on the offensive in a
southeasterly direction.
To
support the left flank of the 38th CPV Army, the 125th CPV
Infantry Divisioon was detached from the 42nd CPV Army, which had to
advance from the Sinpung area towards Kundangdon. The 124th CPV
Infantry Division of this army had the mission of advancing in the direction of
Orichyon. The 1st KPA Group Army, defending along that indicated
line, had to not permit the forces of the I US Corps move in the direction of
Tongju
Sinuiju
. With a goal of reinforcing the defense on this direction, the Unified Command
decided to concentrate the 66th CPV Army in the rear area of the 1st
KPA Group Army.
For
launching the counterstrike against the three South Korean infantry divisions,
ten infantry divisions were assembled that gave them a three-to-one numerical
superiority over the enemy.
Starting on the morning of 29 October, the 39th CPV Army began its
offensive. Inflicting serious losses on the 1st ROK Infantry Division
in the Uznan area, it chased its units in a southerly direction, took Uznan and
by the end of the day on 3 November had moved to a line on the southern slopes
of the Hyancha-san Mountains and Kandong, where they ran into stiff resistance
by the 1st US Cavalry Division which had been sent to the front.
The 40th
CPV Army, which went on the offensive on 30 October in the area southeast of
Sanwontong, destroyed up to two regiments of the 6th ROK Infantry
Division and, developing their success in the direction of Nonbatong, by 3
November took the line Sankudong Tonsong. The 118th CPV Infantry
Division of this army, together with the 148th CPV Infantry Division
of the 50th CPV Army, surrounded and destroyed the 7th
Infantry Regiment of the 6th ROK Infantry Division in the area of
Kodan, which had been moving from Chyosan to the south.
The 38th
CPV Army, which went on the offensive on 29 October, chased the enemy from the
Hichen area, inflicting heavy casualties on the units of the 8th ROK
Infantry Division and, continuing to develop their success in a southwesterly
direction, by 3 November had taken the line Chachak Bawon. Moving up to 60
kilometers, the forces of the army were deep in the rear area of the I US Corps.
The 125th CPV Infantry Division of the 42nd CPV Army took
the city of
Tokchyon
.
On the
Hamhung direction, the 124th and 126th CPV Infantry
Divisions of the 42nd CPV Army, going on the offensive and tightly
holding on to the enemy as they moved south, fought with units of the 3rd
ROK Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division in the area of
Orichyon.
On the
Sinuiju
direction, the weakened units of the 1st KPA Group Army were not
able to put up a stiff resistance to the I US Corps, and were forced to retreat
in a northwesterly direction.
By 2
November the American forces had reached the line Tonnim,
Munsu-san
Mountain
Chennondong Kusong Sindandong, where they stopped to deploy their
forces along this line against the 66th CPV Army. They did not have
the forces to break through into
Sinuiju
, as well as in conjunction with the threatened encirclement of their forces
northwest of Bakchong the UN forces command decided that on 3 November they
would have to being withdrawing the I US Corps to the
Chongchon
River
. The forces of the 1st KPA Group Army and the 66th CPV
Army began to follow the enemy with limited forces. In this fashion the units of
the I US Corps, covered by a rear guard, withdrew to the area of Anju. In order
to not permit further advances by the Chinese Volunteers in a southerly
direction, the enemy brought up his reserves into this area the 2nd
US and 7th ROK Infantry Divisions, which were moved to the line
Kechyon Tokchyon.
The
forces of the 13th CPV Group Army and the 1st KPA Group
Army, continuing to advance in a southerly direction, drove back the American
and South Korean forces to the Chongchon River and on 5 November took the line
from north of Anju to north of Kechyon to Tokchyon and then Nyonwon, where they
ran into organized enemy resistance. By this time, having expended all of their
material resources, the 1st KPA Group Army began to show real needs
for provisions and ammunition. The Unified Command decided to terminate further
advances, so that they could strengthen the successes they had achieved and
prepare their forces for a new offensive operation.
For that
reason, as a result of the combat operations between 29 October and 5 November
the forces of the 13th CPV Group Army and the 1st KPA
Group Army had corrected the threat of an enemy breakthrough on the
Sinuiju
direction to the borders of the PRC. In these operations heavy losses were
inflicted on the 1st, 6th and 8th ROK Infantry
Divisions. During the course of the operations the forces captured more than
4,000 enemy soldiers and officers, 120 guns and mortars, 400 vehicles and many
other items of weapons and equipment.
The overall depth achieved by the offensive was around 45-50 kilometers, with an
average speed of movement of 5-6 kilometers per day.
It follows to stress that the conduct of the operation to destroy the enemy by
the Unified Command in the areas of Unzan, Sanwontong, and Hichen did not meet
its established goals. The destruction of the forces of the II ROK Corps did not
take place. There was a delay in following the enemy by the 1st KPA
Group Army and 66th CPV Army. This let the enemy retreat to the
Chongchon
River
.
But at the same time the counterstrike, being the first offensive by the Chinese
Peoples Volunteers against the Singman Rhee forces, showed that it was
completely possible for them to crush well-equipped enemy forces, even when
inferior to them in weaponry, but superior to them in morale and fighting
spirit. This success made the belief in the possibility of victory over the
enemy by the CPV and KPA even stronger.
- Combat
Operations by the Chinese Volunteers and Korean Peoples Army from
6 to 24 November 1950
Believing that they had halted the offensive by the CPV and KPA and
underestimating their combat capability, the American command once again
prepared to renew the offensive on all fronts.
Starting on the morning of 6 November, and without regrouping and preparing on
the directions of Tokchyon and Hichen, the forces of the II ROK Corps went on
the offensive, and on 8 November the formations of the I US Corps went on the
offensive on the
Sinuiju
direction.
During the first days the forces of the CPV and KPA put up stiff resistance to
Un forces along the lines they occupied. But at the same time they were unable
to halt the pace of the enemy. On the
Sinuiju
direction the I US Corps succeeded in forcing the
Chongchon
River
in the Anju area and during six days of hard combat with the formations of the
1st KPA Group Army and the 39th and 40th CPV
Armies moved forward about 6-10 kilometers. On 13 November the enemy took the
line of hills along the
Taerkong
River
, Bakchong, Inri and north of Bawon. On the Hichen direction the formations of
the 38th and 42nd CPV Armies likewise were forced to
withdraw to the north. On 13 November the formations of these armies fought
along the line north of Tanpori Tokchyon Mensan. The enemy, using all
his technological and fire superiority, drove all his efforts towards crushing
the forces of the CPV and KPA. The Unified decided to withdraw the main body of
the 1st KPA Group Army and the 13th CPV Group Army to the
line Kouksan Panhyong north of Techyon Unzan Sinfundong
Nyonwon in order to take up a more advantageous flanking position, keep the
enemy moving along mountain roads and then, after completing the assembly of the
forces of the 9th CPV Group Army in the area of Tonmungori and south,
go over to the counteroffensive on the Pyongyang and Hamhung directions.
By the night of 14 November the CPV and KPA forces began to retreat under the
protection of a rear guard.
With the goal of moving to the northern border of the DPRK, on 14 November the
American command renewed the offensive on all fronts. The formations of I US
Corps and the II ROK Corps, overcoming resistance by the units of the 1st
KPA Group Army and the 39th and 40th CPV Armies, had moved
to a point 5-7 kilometers northeast of Bakchong and took Neybin by 20 November.
Meeting stiff resistance from the Chinese Volunteers, the forces of the main
American force grouping halted their offensive and reorganized their forces,
with which they planned to continue the offensive along this direction.
On the Hamhung direction and the east coast, the enemy, fighting with two fresh
divisions from the X US Corps, broke through the defense of the units of the 42nd
CPV Army and the 2nd KPA Group Army in the area of Orichyon and
Pukchyon and continued the offensive in a northerly direction. By 20 November
the 1st Marine Division had moved into the area north of Hagaru-ri,
and on 24 November the 7th US Infantry Division had moved to the
Sino-Korean border in the area of Hesandin. The 3rd ROK Infantry
Division fought with units of the 4th KPA Army in the area of Hemun.
Operating along the east coast, enemy forces received continuous fire support
from the warships of the unified UN fleet.
On these directions the American and South Korean forces moved 60-80 kilometers
to the north and northwest and took a number of important settlements in the
northeastern part of the DPRK.
By this time the formations of the 9th CPV Group Army had finished
assembling in the areas southwest of the Chanjing Reservoir.
On the Hichen direction the American command had, in order to take the cities of
Bugdin and Hichen, committed the reserves of IX US Corps (the 2nd and
25th US Infantry Divisions) and, after regrouping their forces, began
the offensive once again on the morning of 24 November with the forces of the I
US and IX US and also the II ROK Corps.
As a result, the offensive by the American and South Korean forces on the
Sinuiju and Hichen directions succeeded in driving 15-20 kilometers to the north
and by the end of the day on 24 November had taken the line east of Tonju
south of Techyon and Uznan
Kundandong Nyonwon. By noon on 25 November the Singman Rhee forces, after an
unsuccessful attempt to get their offensive to develop in the western sector of
the front, went over to the defense along their line of achievement.
For that reason, during the course of 20 days of hard combat the CPV and KPA had
succeeded in not only halting the offensive along the Sinuiju and Hichen
directions, but had created the conditions for preparing for their own offensive
operation.
-
The
Counteroffensive of the Chinese Volunteers and the Korean Peoples
Army in
North Korea
(25 November 18 December 1950)[4]
By 25 November, the
UN forces were in the following positions. On the Pyongyang direction, the I US
Corps with three infantry divisions and one infantry brigade was defending a
line from east of the outskirts of Tonju to Kosandong; the 1st US
Cavalry Division of this corps
compromised the corps reserve and was deployed in the area of Sunchong. The IX
US Corps with two infantry divisions occupied the line from Kosandong to east of
Kundandong. The II ROK Corps with three infantry divisions was maintaining the
line from Samindong to south of Tokhwa, with the 6th ROK Infantry
Division in reserve in the area of Tokchyon.
On the Hamhung
direction, the X US Corps with units of the 1st Marine Division was
maintaining the area around Hagaru-ri. The 7th US Infantry Division
from this corps had moved to the Sino-Korean border in the area of Hesandin. The
3rd US Infantry Division was in reserve at Hamhung.
Along the east coast
was the I ROK Corps with two infantry divisions and units of the Capital
Infantry Division, holding the area of Nanam and fighting for Chengjin; the 3rd
ROK Infantry Division had taken Paegam.
The operational
reserve of the American command consisted of the 2nd, 5th,
9th, and 11th ROK Infantry Divisions, the 29th
British Infantry Brigade, and the independent Turkish Infantry Brigade, the 17th
and 30th Independent ROK Infantry Regiments, the 187th RCT,
the 5th RCT from
Hawaii
, and up to ten independent battalions.
The forces composing
the enemy reserve were simultaneously carrying out the mission of rear area
security of objects and lines of communication and carrying out combat against
partisan detachments.
Overall, the UN
ground forces numbered 10 ROK infantry divisions and 7 US infantry divisions,
two British and one Turkish infantry brigades, four independent infantry
regiments, and up to ten independent battalions presented by different
governments. Beside that, the forces also had four independent tank battalions,
14 independent artillery battalions, and a significant number of antiaircraft
and engineer units and special technical subunits of the reserve of the high
command. The average strength of a South Korean division was 11-12,000 men, and
that of the American divisions 17-18,000. The 1st Marine Division
numbered nearly 23,000 men. The British and Turkish infantry brigades, as well
as the American 187th RCT, each numbered around 6,000 men. Overall
the UN ground forces had around 360,000 men, 2,300 guns and mortars, and up to
1,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces.
The UN aviation at
this time numbered about 1,600 combat aircraft and transports.[5]
Having complete air superiority, they launched systematic strikes against
assembly areas and the combat order of forces, rear area lines of communication,
supply bases, river crossings over the
Yalu
River
, the Supung hydroelectric power station, airfields and other important objects
in the rear areas of the CPV and KPA forces.
Along the east and west coasts of
Korea
, naval forces from the combined UN fleet kept up close cooperation with ground
forces with their more than 170 warships, including 15 major warships
(battleships, cruisers, and aircraft carriers). In order to support fleet
operations, there were more than 100 auxiliary vessels in its makeup and more
than 400 carrier-based aircraft. The primary effort of the fleet was directed
towards fire support for ground forces operating along the coasts, blockading
the coasts and destroying troops, the destruction of lines of communication and
other objects in the rear areas of the CPV and KPA forces.
The CPV
and KPA forces, which had reorganized at the same time they had withdrawn to the
mountains, were located in the following areas by 25 November: the 50th
CPV Army was located from west of Tonju to Panhyon; the 66th CPV
Army, from Techyon to Unzan.
In the
rear areas of these armies, in the area of Kunson and west, were assembled the 1st
KPA Group Army forces that had been weakened by continuous combat. The 8th
KPA Infantry Division was concentrated in the area of Chyonsan to cover the
crossings over the
Yalu
River
.
Along
the front from Uznan to Kopewon was the operational area of the 39th
CPV Army; to its left, from Hengancham to
Mount
Hyonzebyon
, was the 40th CPV Army. Along the line from Samkori to Onchanni were
the 38th and 42nd CPV Armies.
In the
area northwest of Sanchanri were assembled the remnants of the 2nd, 4th,
5th and 7th KPA Infantry Divisions of the former 2nd
KPA Group Army that had been able to escape from the enemys rear area.[6]
In the
area north and west of Hagaru-ri were the final assembly areas for the 9th
CPV Group Army.
The 20th
CPV Army took up starting positions in the area of Sinphori, with one division
on line southwest of Sanchanri.
North
of Hagaru-ri, in the area of Toksil-ri, was the 27th CPV Army. The 26th
CPV Army was assembled in the area of Upsan-ri.
The
makeup of the 13th and 9th CPV Group Armies included 30
infantry divisions (each one averaging 10-11,000 men in strength), four howitzer
artillery divisions, one antiaircraft artillery division, and two engineer
regiments. Overall the forces of the Chinese Volunteers, together with their
service subunits, railway units, and rear services establishments numbered
531,500 men.
Along
the east coast, in the area of the port and city of
Chengjin
, the enemy continued to be resisted by the weakened formations of the 4th
KPA Army.
The
main command of the KPA took decisive measures to strengthen the combat
capability of the 1st, 2nd and 4th KPA Armies
and form new reserve formations. In the area of Kangae they continued to man and
train the forces of the 3rd and 5th KPA Armies. On the
territory of the northeastern section of
China
they continued to man and train the formations of the 6th, 7th
and 8th KPA Armies.
The 17
divisions and one brigade of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd,
4th and 5th KPA Armies numbered 103,000 men. The average
strength of a division was 5,500 men.
The
overall strength of the CPV and KPA was more than 600,000 men. These forces had
2,492 guns and mortars larger than 76mm caliber and up to 67 medium tanks and
self-propelled guns.
The
extreme shortage of aircraft in the CPV meant they were only specifically able
to cover the crossings over the
Yalu
River
in the
Antung
area. The KPA aviation consisted of all of 30 combat aircraft, which were used
for training flying personnel.
There
were only several small schooners in the naval forces, which were used to
protect the coasts.
The
overall force ratios are given here in Table 8.
Table 8
|
CPV
and KPA Forces
|
Forces
of the 8th US Army
|
Ratio
|
|
CPV
|
KPA
|
Total
|
US
and Allies
|
ROK
|
Total
|
|
Divisions
Personnel
Guns
76mm
and up
45mm
and RR
AA
37mm and up
60mm
and 88.9mm bazookas
Mortars
60mm
81mm
and up
Tanks
and SPs
Aircraft
|
31
531,500
1,097
141
128
-
2,487
1,048
-
120
|
17*
103,000
117
67
27
-
-
230
67
30
|
48*
634,500
1,214
208
155
-
2,487
1,278
67
150
|
11**
208,500
604
990
308
3,809
697
592
1,000
1,300***
|
10
151,500
180
180
-
3,020
840
900
-
-
|
21**
360,000
784
1,170
308
6,829
1,537
1,492
1,000
1,300***
|
2.3:1
1.5:1
1:5
1:2
-
1.6:1
1.1:1
1:15
1:8.7
|
|
*Note
without the formations of the 6th, 7th
and 8th KPA Armies
**Note
Includes brigades, regiments and battalions
</ |